

Advancing Stability in an Era of Change

PROJECT ON WORLD SECURITY
ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND

Jane Wales



THIS IS AN INTERACTIVE DOCUMENT

Any text that appears in [blue](#) is a hyperlink to another part of the document, an email address, or a page on the world wide web.

JANE WALES, who was the director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund's Project on World Security (1996–1998), is now the president and chief executive officer of the World Affairs Council of Northern California. Previously, she served as Associate Director of the White House Office of Science Technology Policy and Senior Director of the National Security Council. Prior to this dual appointment in the Clinton Administration, she chaired the international programs at the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the W. Alton Jones Foundation.

ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, INC.
437 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022-7001
Telephone: 212.812.4200
Facsimile: 212.812.4299
E-mail: rock@rbf.org
World Wide Web: www.rbf.org

Copyright © 2000, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.

Design: H Plus Incorporated

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
PART I. AN ERA OF CHANGE	6
A. Global Trends	6
B. Global Dangers	6
C. Global Actors	9
PART II. FOUNDATION RESPONSES TO A CHANGING WORLD	11
A. Generating New Knowledge	11
B. Support for State Actors	18
C. Support for Non-State Actors	19
D. Support for Indigenous Philanthropy	21
E. Support for Transitional Regimes	21
F. Internal Restructuring and Adaptation in U.S.-Based Foundations	22
PART III: INVESTING IN THE FUTURE	24
Strand #1: Understanding Global Trends	25
Strand #2: Strengthening Global Actors	29
Strand #3: Effecting New Partnerships	35
Strand #4: Building a Consensus	37
PART IV: CONCLUSION	44

INTRODUCTION

This is an era characterized by changing relationships, rapid and large-scale transnational interactions, and the globalization of previously local activities and concerns. It poses great, and often urgent, challenges to policy-makers, activists, and analysts working to promote world stability. Many of the foundations that support such work have concluded that, in the midst of uncertainty, cooperation and social innovation at all levels of human activity are necessary if individuals and societies are to manage and adapt to change. Foundations recognize that they can and must play a role in making this possible.¹

This paper argues for an integrated grant-making strategy for world security, stewardship, and the peaceful management of change. Its method would be:

- to enhance the accountability, transparency, and efficacy of state and civil society institutions; and
- to embed them in collaborative arrangements, or regimes, designed to cooperatively address the challenges ahead.

These regimes would rely on a combination of state and non-state actors, with the mantle of leadership shifting from one to the other according to the task at hand.

In making this case, the paper focuses, therefore, on five increasingly global actors: the individual, the nation-state, civil society organizations (CSOs), private sector corporations, and multilateral institutions. Part I considers the trends that continually redefine relations among these decision-makers, the dangers to which they contribute or fall victim, and opportunities for innovative partnerships among them.

For much of the twentieth century, foundations played a vital role in strengthening international actors by supporting academic and policy-relevant research, practical experimentation, and public education. Grant-makers actively worked to improve governance at all levels. Most recently, they have attempted to help state and non-state actors understand and manage fast-paced change and have begun to adjust their funding programs accordingly. The paper's second part, therefore, reports on the ways that foundations have restructured their programs and reoriented their funding strategies so as to help new decision-makers come to grips with the transformation under way.

The paper's third part puts forward a four-part agenda for future grant-making aimed at helping to provide the building blocks of a dynamic but stable new order that is both sustainable and secure. It argues that foundations can and should continue to be bold. In a time of swift public judgments and unforgiving market response, foundations may be alone in their willingness to take risks, withstand criticism, and make long-term investments in the public interest. It is therefore important that they remain at the cutting edge of social innovation, recognizing that the most significant results of their contributions may not be those that are immediately apparent.

¹ The author wishes to express her gratitude to the trustees of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and to the Fund's president Colin G. Campbell for their inspiration, leadership, and unfailing support throughout the life of the Project on World Security; and to members of the Project's Core Advisory Group, including Colin G. Campbell, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., John D. Steinbruner, General John Galvin, Emma Rothschild, John P. Holdren, Jessica T. Mathews, William Luers, Jean-Francois Rischard, Kennette Benedict, Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, and Russell A. Phillips, whose vision, advocacy, and hard work helped to shape the Project's mission and its products; and to Renée de Nevers, whose brilliant editing and sound advice greatly enhanced the quality of the Project's work. Also essential to the Project's success was the energy, good humor, and helpful research provided by Gwyneth J. Borden. Amir Pasic was kind enough to provide his comments, criticisms, and supporting arguments throughout, as were the Rockefeller Brothers Fund program staff and the many outstanding scholars, foundation officers, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders to whom the Project turned for ideas and guidance. While influenced and informed by the vibrant community of specialists in the fields of international relations, security, and science, the views expressed in this document are solely those of the author.

PART I: AN ERA OF CHANGE

The context that gives rise to an integrated approach to grant-making in support of world stability is one of rapid and sometimes wrenching change. The Cold War's end uncovered a kaleidoscope of interacting trends that are altering relations within and among states and across sectors and disciplines. If well managed, these trends can combine to invigorate states and empower individuals, enhancing security, stewardship, and quality of life. If unmanaged or mismanaged, these same forces can undermine the capacity of states to govern and of nature to provide.

A. GLOBAL TRENDS

At least three transnational trends, or drivers of change, define a new era, often referred to as the Knowledge Era or the Information Age:

- The first driver of change is the communications revolution's worldwide diffusion of information, capital, technology, and ideas. This "third industrial revolution" has decentralized decision-making and authority and has enhanced the role of networks of nongovernmental actors, both legitimate and criminal.
- The second, related trend is the ongoing restructuring of the globalized economy, redistributing wealth and power. The global economy has lifted millions of people from poverty. It has raised levels of opportunity. But it has also raised levels of uncertainty, producing stunning reversals of fortune, as the contagion of financial crises demonstrates. While many benefit from economic globalization, others have been left behind, and potentially destabilizing inequities remain. In the structural shift in labor markets from manufacturing to knowledge-based jobs, the income advantage of those with access to education is rapidly growing, threatening new divisions along educational lines.
- The third trend relates to demographic shifts, including aging societies in the developed world and population surges at the low end of the economic and educational ladder in the developing world. These surges will add almost one billion people per decade to the global population and will require a doubling of food and a tripling of energy production in the next 50 years, stressing an already strained natural environment. A young, mobile population will move to cities at a rate of one million per week, requiring water, electricity, sewage, transportation, and sources of employment. No society is fully prepared.

While the full consequences of the interactions among these trends are not known, it is clear that all societies are experiencing transitions, and none can manage these processes on its own. Whether individuals and societies succeed or fail in the face of global trends depends in large measure on the degree to which they are integrated into a larger political, economic, and security order.

B. GLOBAL DANGERS

Security specialists argue that the stakes of such integration are high. For example, spurred and enabled by smart policies and the revolution in information,

communications, and transportation technologies, successful states on every continent have joined the world economy. They have benefited from global trade and investment flows, enabling them to provide for their citizens who, in turn, can join world society. The stake these individuals, societies, and state governments have in the international order is apparent. Indeed, some scholars argue that wars among these states are increasingly improbable as the potential costs rise and perceived benefits decline. Other states have become economic outcasts—some by their leaders' choice but most by their inability to provide effective governance, navigate societal stresses, and compete on a global scale. As a result, their citizens have been starved of the capital, technology, and training needed to succeed in the Knowledge Era. Majorities have no stake in the existing order, and violence within these states, ranging from spontaneous rioting to organized civil conflict, is increasingly likely.

Furthermore, the global economy is a fierce task master. With the speed of millions of independent electronic transfers, it can take away all that it gives. States that have opened their economies find that global markets have rules, and the punishment for failing to abide by them can be sudden, harsh, and globally consequential. Societies in transition, in which expectations have been raised and subsequently dashed, can be the most vulnerable to political instability, environmental destruction, and violent conflict.

While information-driven integration can strengthen individuals, states, and societies, it also has costs. Old dangers are transformed, and new ones emerge. Both diminish the significance of political boundaries and require a collaborative response. The traditional security concerns about Great Power conflict, the emergence of regional hegemony, and the nuclear danger remain salient. There is a need to assess the degree to which transnational trends exacerbate or ameliorate these and other pressing dangers. Among those dangers are:

- ***Weapons Proliferation and Arms Transfers:*** Advanced weapons materials, technology, and expertise have become more widely available, as all freely cross borders, export controls are relaxed, and states relinquish their monopoly over the development and production of key weapons components. The breakdown of controls over former Soviet forces and the spread of nuclear capability to South Asia have given cooperative nonproliferation efforts new urgency. Regional arms races offer insights into the demand side of the proliferation problem. And they underscore the importance of both establishing universal norms and of crafting region-wide solutions that prevent the emergence of hegemonic neighbors. The proliferation problem encompasses the full range of military technology, from weapons of mass destruction and weapons of precision guidance, to more humble technologies, such as anti-personnel land mines, rifles, and explosives.
- ***Hyper-Nationalism:*** Social, cultural, environmental, and economic dislocations that accompany globalization and modernization can give rise to destructive strains of nationalism and tribalism. When tapped by political opportunists and combined with the growing norm of self-determination, these impulses can fuel communal conflict, leading to widespread violence, state collapse, and even interstate war.
- ***Terrorism:*** Weakened states offer training grounds and safe havens for terrorist groups whose reach has been extended by the spread of technologies. Moreover,

advances in information technologies have given the United States and its allies overwhelming advantage on the battlefield, which may drive potential enemies to eschew traditional forms of warfare in favor of terrorism. Increasingly porous borders, a growing reliance on a vulnerable electronic infrastructure, and the worldwide availability of advanced weapons provide powerful incentives for governments and industries to cooperate in protecting against terrorist attacks, while at the same time preserving civil liberties of citizens and non-citizens alike.

- ***Transnational Crime:*** As economic transactions become increasingly transnational, so too does organized crime. Citizens rely on their governments, both local and national, for the provision of public order. But in the face of powerful multinational criminal cartels, no community can fully protect its own. There are no well-developed mechanisms for addressing transnational crime. There are only extradition treaties and Interpol, a wire service that enables national law enforcement agencies to communicate with their counterparts in other states. Cross-border cooperation is needed not only to prevent crimes and apprehend their perpetrators but also to address the societal problems that engender criminal activity.

- ***Social and Economic Inequity:*** While markets may provide for the “rational” distribution of wealth, they do not assure equity. Economic disparities can reinforce social divides, which can undermine societal cohesion and success. States will need to assure their citizens that, while the costs and benefits of economic globalization are not equitably distributed, there are mechanisms in place for ensuring greater equity. But fears of international market response constrain the impulse to make local public investments or redistribute wealth. Basic rules of equity that transcend borders, economies, and cultures may be required to form the basis for sound social policy.

- ***Infectious Diseases:*** The volume, scale, and speed of global trade and travel have raised the risk that emerging infectious diseases and new, drug-resistant strains of old ones will spread. It is possible to reach any national capital from virtually every corner of the earth within 36 hours. Yet the incubation period for many of the most deadly diseases is one of several days. Identifying, treating, and perhaps eradicating the disease at its source is the only reliable means of protection and is a global obligation. Multinational, multilayered, and multisectoral networks are needed to provide early warning of outbreaks and to provide the basis for organizing coordinated action.

- ***Resources Mal-Distribution or Scarcity:*** The livelihood of nearly one-third of the earth’s population depends on direct access to natural resources that can be grown, gathered, or caught. As populations and commerce grow, so too will the demands placed on a fixed or declining resource base. The poorest societies will be most hard-hit by scarcity of land, water, and forest products or by mal-distribution due to lack of proper infrastructure and efficient local governance. Similarly, the convergence of poor policy, inadequate infrastructure, and bad weather conditions can threaten the security of basic food sources. The resulting misery can produce effects throughout the region and beyond: hunger, famine, disease, societal breakdown, violent conflict, mass migrations, and environmental damage.

- ***Environmental Degradation:*** Population pressures in the developing world may combine with unsustainable levels of consumption in the developed world to bring about the gradual altering of the earth’s physiology. Scientists warn that human

behavior—particularly the burning of fossil fuels—has had a discernable impact on global climate. The possibility that warming and weather extremes will result raises concerns about physical damage and loss of life on a large scale. Similarly, ozone depletion and biodiversity loss produce irreversible effects, the full consequences of which are yet to be known. Without cooperative efforts to innovate and regulate, the earth's capacity to support life as we know it may be undermined.

C. GLOBAL ACTORS

At the same time that these dangers have emerged, so has a plethora of new players, able to advance or undermine security, sustainability, and quality of life. They include large, populous, and resourceful states that have been newly strengthened by the global economy, as well as non-state actors that have grown in number, power, and political significance. Their fates are intertwined.

- ***The Individual.*** The individual citizen's reach has been extended by information and transportation technologies. Many of the dangers faced and the solutions offered are the result of the aggregate effect of citizens' separate choices. The challenge of promoting personal responsibility, therefore, can be a global interest.
- ***The Nation-State.*** The nation-state remains a central actor in managing economic, environmental, and social policy; in protecting basic group and individual rights; in meeting security needs; and in providing for the public good. The challenge is to build, refine, and continually adapt the institutions and processes of national governance to keep up with the pace of change.
- ***Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).*** CSOs, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have grown increasingly influential at the local, national, and transnational levels. Their growing impact raises the challenge of ensuring that they adhere to the same standards of accountability, transparency, and efficacy that are applied to governmental actors.
- ***Private Sector Corporations.*** Multinational corporations and other private sector actors have joined governments in regulating the terms of international trade. Increasingly, corporations and industry groups cooperate on issues like environmental or labor standards to which their subsidiaries will be held. Furthermore, they are key to implementing and monitoring certain weapons nonproliferation agreements.
- ***Multilateral Institutions, Transnational Organizations, and Global Regimes.*** These institutions, understandings, and arrangements, charged with global governance, jointly manage the transnational issues and dangers that could otherwise undermine the success of all.

The challenge is to strengthen and inform each of these actors, while encouraging their collaboration, as none can be successful on its own. The capacity of a state is a function of the ingenuity of its citizenry. Individuals cannot thrive without a just and reliable order that only a healthy, accountable state can provide. The more capable the state, its civil society, and corporate sector, the better able it is to contribute to efforts to address transnational dangers. The more embedded the state in global

regimes, the more likely it will be able to meet its citizens' needs and expectations and fulfill its domestic governance responsibilities.

Transnational governance requires the establishment of relationships, understandings, and shared expectations that are both self-regulating and self-sustaining. It demands a commitment on the part of all actors to prevent or contain global wildfires and to take greater responsibility for themselves, for one another, and for the future. It demands innovative partnerships that cut across all levels of global activity, from individuals to states to international institutions. These new arrangements and understandings should take advantage of the growing competence of states and non-state actors and their new-found experience in problem-solving and governance across political, disciplinary, and sectoral lines. Because these trends and their effects are transnational in nature, so too must be the efforts to manage them. Despite the impressive array of norms, agreements, institutions and processes, for global governance that have emerged over the past 50 years, the demand continues to outstrip the supply.

PART II: FOUNDATION RESPONSES TO A CHANGING WORLD

Foundations were involved in issues relating to security, sustainability, and quality of life for much of the twentieth century. Their ongoing support for collaboration and invention is critical to meeting the governance challenges ahead. After Communism's collapse, they were quick to consider whether something larger than the failure of the Soviet state was underway. They inquired whether a process of fundamental and ongoing change might have been unleashed—change that was both a cause and a consequence of the Cold War's end. Many concluded that change was driven by the information revolution, the resulting economic globalization, and human interaction on a larger scale and at a greater speed than theretofore imagined.² Understanding and managing the dynamics of this new age became a central objective of foundations, scholars, and practitioners concerned with international security, a healthy natural environment, and improved quality of life.

Foundation support in these fields has encompassed activities ranging from the generation of new knowledge to building consensus across political and disciplinary lines. Discussed below are some of the complementary and often overlapping strategies for helping new decision-makers to understand and manage change.

A. GENERATING NEW KNOWLEDGE

1. Support for New Concepts and Mechanisms for Governing

In the early 1990s, foundations funded projects designed to help governments think about and prepare for the kinds of dangers they were likely to confront, ranging from deliberate acts of aggression to social and environmental collapse. They considered new “threats” to security and sustainability, the origins of which were spontaneous as well as organized, indigenous as well as foreign.³ Foundations financed scholarship that both examined and sought to anticipate rapid change and provided new concepts and mechanisms for governing. For example, the concept of “cooperative security,” which prescribes restraint in the deployments and activities of military organizations, was developed with the aim of putting self-regulating mechanisms in place to prevent wars between states and to provide for collective action should war nonetheless occur.⁴

This work was accompanied by the development of the concept of “human security,” which advocates investing in sustainable economic development, meeting basic human needs, and providing for an improved quality of life, so as to create the conditions for peace within states.⁵ The growing belief that the dangers the world community faced had become too numerous, too varied, too fast-acting, and too consequential for adequate response led to an emphasis on policies of prevention. Human security concepts were meant to justify action at the earliest possible stage, long before a problem festered, spread, and led to a crisis.

A number of foundations have pursued the human security agenda by actively supporting efforts that serve to strengthen individuals through investments in

² Brookings Institution scholar John D. Steinbruner was among the first to argue this point in his writings and advice to foundations (See “Problems in Strategic Realignment,” in *Is the Atlantic Widening? Atlantic Area Nations after the Cold War*, David Hale, et al., (Chicago: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). Others include Nobel Prize-winning physicist Murray Gellmann of the Santa Fe Institute, in his book *The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex* (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1994); and historian Paul Kennedy of Yale University, in his book *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

³ See Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security* (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, a publication of The American Assembly, 1992).

⁴ The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the W. Alton Jones Foundation supported the early work of Steinbruner and his Brookings colleagues in developing the concept of cooperative security and considering its operational consequences. The concept was further developed and applied to the problem of weapons proliferation by the Carnegie-supported Cooperative Security Consortium, comprised of scholars from Brookings, Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA), Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), and Russia's Institute for the Study of U.S.-Canada (ISKAN). That effort resulted in a Brookings-edited volume, *Global Engagement*, Janne E. Nolan, editor. Nolan, now at the Twentieth Century Fund, and Barry Blechman and Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center, continue to explore the operational consequences and political viability of cooperative security concepts.

⁵ Foundations supporting the development of this concept include the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which funded the Common Security Forum convened by the Centre for History and Economics, Kings College, Cambridge; the Center for Population and Development Studies, Harvard University; and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Principal investigators included Emma Rothschild and Lincoln Chen. The Pew Global Stewardship Initiative also provided funding for this project, as did the Japanese and Swedish governments, and UNICEF. For a discussion of human security, see Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?” *Daedalus*, vol. 124, no. 3 (1995).

education and public health, economic development assistance, and the promotion of human rights. They have advanced women's education and reproductive health. Efforts to strengthen individuals and societies by promoting sustainable economic development⁶ have long been carried out by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. The Rockefeller Foundation is credited with having fostered the "Green Revolution" and sustainable agriculture; its president, Gordon Conway, coined the latter term at an earlier time. The Ford Foundation's long-term commitment to equity in economic development has been demonstrated around the globe. The David and Lucille Packard Foundation has focused its international grant-making on population stabilization and sustainable resource management.

Foundation-supported scholarship also resulted in new considerations of potential violence between cultures, such as Harvard scholar Samuel P. Huntington's article, "Clash of Civilizations?" His book by that title argued that, with the end of the bipolar stalemate, conflict is likely to break out along "civilizational" divides.⁷ Efforts by both scholars and policy-makers to further examine this concept and its practical consequences have been supported by the John M. Olin Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation; and has attracted some corporate foundation support.

Whatever their point of view about sources of future authority, stability, or conflict, an increasing number of scholars have agreed that there has been a fundamental change in what Reverend J. Bryan Hehir refers to as "the structure of power and principles of order," which guide relationships and understandings within and among states.⁸ In 1983 Richard H. Ullman of Princeton University and in 1989 Jessica T. Mathews, then of the World Resources Institute, wrote forceful articles calling for a "redefinition" of security, to include nonmilitary threats to human life, social stability, and political order.⁹

Prominent scholars, like Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School Dean Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Dean Paul C. Wolfowitz, and former Secretary of Defense and World Bank President Robert S. McNamara, have written that some important security concerns have not changed, while opportunities for addressing them may have. The need to pay heed to Great Power relations and to reduce the nuclear danger remain constant in the Information Age.¹⁰ Nye and Duke University political scientist Robert Keohane have noted that the web of relationships created by increasing interdependence among state and non-state actors has not displaced the nation-state, which remains an important and resilient source of authority, power, and influence.¹¹ Military power still plays an important role, and traditional security concerns continue to take precedence over other international matters. Nye points out, however, that states have new opportunities to use their economic and moral suasion to achieve their ends, including what he terms the "soft power" that stems from greater economic and cultural interactions among non-state actors across national lines.¹² The resulting spread of popular culture and the image of the good life the United States represents create these less tangible sources of influence.

Others have maintained—as have University of Chicago scholar John J. Mearsheimer and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—that shifts in world politics do not call for a change in basic strategy. Their "Realist" advocacy of balance-of-power politics continues.¹³ This debate led to much research into the ways in which the

⁶ The 1987 *Brundtland Commission Report* defines sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." See the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) Report, *Our Common Future*, 43.

⁷ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

⁸ See J. Bryan Hehir, "Intervention: From Theories to Cases," *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 9 (1995), pp. 1–4. Also see Hehir's remarks at the June 1996 Core Group meeting of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on World Security, www.rbf.org/pws

⁹ See Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 1 (summer 1983) and Jessica Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1989).

¹⁰ See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Conflicts after the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1996) and "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 4 (July/August 1995); Wolfowitz, "America at the End of the Century: Problems on the Horizon," *Current*, no. 393 (June 1997); and "Bridging Centuries: Fin de Siecle All Over Again," *The National Interest*, no. 47 (Spring 1997); McNamara, "The Nuclear Emperor has No Clothes," *New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 12, no. 3.

¹¹ See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "States and the Information Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1998).

¹² See William Owens and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1996).

¹³ University of Chicago scholar John J. Mearsheimer and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger have both argued the continued relevance and efficacy of 19th-century balance-of-power politics. The Bush administration's initial review of national security policy called for *Astutus quo plus*, "reflecting the widespread assumptions of scholars and practitioners at the time, reinforced by the 'realist' school of thought. See Mearsheimer's "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1, (Summer 1990); "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95).

¹⁴ See Paul B. Stares, “The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey” (Tokyo, Japan: Center for International Exchange, 1998). Not all agree that sovereignty is eroding, pointing out that the ideal notion of sovereignty attributed to Westphalia has always been subject to violation or modification. Stephen D. Krasner is the best known scholar making this point, and he is writing a book on the topic. The debate is likely to continue, fueled by disagreements about whether these global changes will have beneficial or harmful effects. Some scholars, such as Richard H. Ullman, have warned of the dangers associated with weak states in the international system, arguing that shoring up the state system is the best defense against modern-day threats to the international community. Other scholars and analysts point out that Great Power relations remain central even in the changing international environment, due to their sheer power. See Krasner’s “Westphalia and All That,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993); “Compromising Westphalia,” *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995); Ullman, *The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996). Among the spate of new books published on sovereignty in recent years are Gene Martin Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, *Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Tom Farer, *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); *The New World Order: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the Self-Determination of Peoples* (Oxford and Washington, D.C.: Berg, 1996); David J. Elkins, *Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1995).

¹⁵ See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).

¹⁶ For a descriptive compilation of such endeavors, see the *Inventary of Security Projects* (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1997).

¹⁷ Among them are Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), the John F. Kennedy School’s Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Defense and Arms Control Program (DACs).

¹⁸ Some specific examples of Olin funding include \$1.5 million over three years for the Olin Institute at Harvard under Samuel P. Huntington’s directorship, for the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia on avoiding a new cold war with Russia, and for Carnes Lord’s professorship at Tufts. Smith Richardson supported the American Enterprise Institute research project on U.S. Military forces in the future, various fellowships at several universities, as well as providing a grant to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for a project on professional military education. Smith Richardson also gave to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities for studying the defense budget, to Harvard for broad studies on U.S. national security policy after the Cold War and a book on the national interest and national security by Samuel P. Huntington. The Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University also received Smith Richardson support for various projects ranging from the Center for Central Asian studies to a project on Russia’s New Security Services and one on Telecommunications and International Relations. Princeton also obtained funding for a research

traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty may have been compromised or challenged and to an ongoing discussion of the relative roles and powers of state and non-state actors.¹⁴ Much of the discussion has rested on the arguments first laid out in the late 1970s by Keohane and Nye in their seminal work, *Power and Interdependence*.¹⁵

2. Support for Multidisciplinary Research

Conceptual innovations have often been the products of collaboration across institutional, disciplinary, and national boundaries. They have included the Cooperative Security Consortium, the Common Security Forum, and the 2050 Project, among others.¹⁶ Foundations have also sought to deepen understanding of political, economic, social, environmental, technological, and traditional security concerns through support for multidisciplinary programs. The Pew Charitable Trusts, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundations have been leaders in promoting interdisciplinary approaches. The latter three have followed explicit strategies of supporting, and in some cases helping to create, academic “centers of excellence” where training in cross-disciplinary study is a central mission.¹⁷ Additionally, MacArthur supports fellowships for multidisciplinary study, both directly and through the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC). And the Pew Charitable Trusts’ Global Security Program provided multi-year support to the Global Security Fellows Initiative at Cambridge University in England.

While foundations such as the John M. Olin, Smith Richardson, and Lynde and Harry Bradley have emphasized established traditions in foreign policy analysis and strategic studies, they have also supported multidisciplinary efforts to come to terms with a changing world.¹⁸ They are, for example, among those that support the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, which has a multidisciplinary curriculum and attracts both students and lecturers from around the globe.

At least one intensive effort to describe the consequences of rapid change—the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Global Trends 2005 Project¹⁹—received primarily corporate support. Another, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) State Failure Task Force, was a U.S. government initiative undertaken by independent scholars from around the country.²⁰ Moreover, a number of scholars have applied the analytic tools of one discipline or sector to tracking and understanding developments in another. This has been the approach of the Sante Fe Institute, for example, which uses high performance computing for the consideration of complex interactions among a variety of factors. Also, the United States and the British intelligence communities and militaries have adopted the use of a corporate planning tool, known as “scenario-building,” in an effort to better equip policy-makers for the full range of possibilities for which they must prepare.

program in international security, and almost \$400,000 went to Yale’s International Security Studies Program under the directorship of Paul Kennedy. Finally, The Bradley Foundation gives many fellowships, including those for graduate students at the department of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, at Princeton for international studies, to SAIS for fellowships and the Strategic Studies Program generally. SAIS also received funding for a project on technology in modern warfare, and a book on East Asia and the American National Interest, as did Harvard for a project on national identity and national interests at the Weatherhead Center, which also was supported with several Bradley fellowships. Bradley also supports the American Enterprise Institute for lectureships and programs.

¹⁹ See Michael J. Mazarr, *Global Trends 2005: The Challenge of a New Millennium* (Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1998).

²⁰ Scholars include Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Daniel Esty, and Marc Levy, among others.

²¹ Inspired by such intellectual leaders as Mathews, Holdren, Kennedy, Steinbruner and others, several younger scholars have devoted their research to these relationships, and to determining whether causal links can clearly be established. Scholars working in this vein include Thomas Homer-Dixon, Michael Renner, Marc Levy, Daniel Esty, and Peter Gleick, among others. Their findings are published in established academic journals and are often summarized in The Environmental Change and Security Project Report of the Woodrow Wilson Center, wwics.si.edu (E-mail: csheehan@sivm.si.edu).

²² For an assessment of the literature on environment and security, see Geoffrey D. Dabelko and P.J. Simmons, "Environment and Security: Core Ideas and U.S. Government Initiatives," *SAIS Review*, vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1997); on changes in the study of security, see Ann M. Florini and P.J. Simmons, *The New Security Thinking: A Review of the North American Literature* (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998). On environmental security, see Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 2 (1991). For the U.S. government's approach to "environmental security," see the *National Security Science and Technology Strategy* and the *National Security Strategy*.

²³ Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Over-population, Tribalism, and Disease are rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 273, no. 2 (February, 1994); and *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996).

²⁴ Thomas Homer-Dixon, of the University of Toronto, has done extensive and rigorous work in this area. For an overview of the research on environment and security, see Dabelko and Simmons, "Environment and Security"; see also Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold."

²⁵ MacArthur, Olin, Smith Richardson and others have supported investigation into the relationships among culture, identity, and security. The Social Science Research Council, through its fellowship program, has sponsored significant research in this area with support from the MacArthur Foundation. For a review of the literature, see Amir Pasic, *Culture, Identity, and Security* (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998) and on www.rbf.org/pws.

²⁶ Pew supported an examination of trade, economics, and security through its Public Policy Program. For reviews of the literature in the areas of economic development, globalization, and political stability, see Joan M. Nelson, *Poverty, Inequality, and Conflict in Developing Countries* (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998); Nicolas van de Walle, *Economic Globalization and Political Stability in Developing Countries* (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998); and Ernest J. Wilson III, *Globalization, Information Technology, and Conflict in the Second and Third Worlds: A Critical Review of the Literature* (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998) and on www.rbf.org/pws.

²⁷ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999).

²⁸ See remarks of Allan Hammond at the September 1996 meeting of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on World Security Core Group, www.rbf.org/pws.

3. Examining the Linkages

Multidisciplinary research has provided the basis for foundations, governments, and corporate funders to support the examination of certain combinations of issues, seeking to better understand the linkages among them. Pew, for example, created its Global Stewardship Initiative to explore the security consequences of demographic shifts and environmental degradation.²¹ Carnegie has added a strand to its Peace and International Security Program to address the problem of conflict over natural resources such as oil and water. And the Rockefeller Foundation has created a new program on global dangers, including environmental concerns. Under the rubric of "environmental security," this has been a salient line of inquiry, even on the policy agenda.²² Experiences in Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti led many policy-makers to conclude that environmental collapse can be an important contributor to violent conflict and state failure. This hunch was reinforced by journalistic observations by Robert Kaplan²³ and is among the topics being examined by the ongoing CIA State Failure Task Force. In undertaking this initiative, the U.S. government has followed the lead of foundations in supporting the exploration of the impact on social cohesion of environmental, social, economic, demographic, and cultural developments.

While some scholars have sought to demonstrate clear causation between environmental stress and violent conflict,²⁴ others have examined linkages among culture, identity, and security.²⁵ Others have considered the possible interactions among economic growth, development, and conflict.²⁶ *New York Times* columnist Thomas L. Friedman has offered his view of the political and social implications of economic globalization in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Russia in his regular op-ed pieces and in his book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*.²⁷

Despite a rich array of research projects, the precise ways in which interacting stresses such as endemic poverty, overpopulation, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, infectious disease, and mass migration affect the outbreak of violent conflict are still not apparent. The research carried out over the past decade has been rich and varied. It has failed, however, to identify the "tipping point" at which these dynamics combine to undermine the capacity of societies to govern or of nature to provide.

There are at least four reasons for this:

- The first is that in most cases, the path is indirect. Deforestation, for example, is unlikely to be the single, direct cause of violence, although its consequences—soil erosion, reduced agricultural output, and hunger—could lead to famine, disease, or migration to cities, which could then trigger a violent response by the population.
- Second, the causes of violent conflict tend to be multiple and highly contextual. For instance, under some conditions environmental problems lead to violence. Under others, however, they do not. Political and social conditions matter, and sound governance—local, national, and international—appears to make the difference between these outcomes.
- The third reason is that some of the underlying causes of conflict are often masked by their political or social expression. Environmental problems, for example, often surface as social or economic problems.²⁸

-
- Fourth, the tipping point may come with the introduction of a subjective variable, which is difficult to measure. It may come, some argue, when the perception of inequity becomes widespread. Whereas measuring inequality is straightforward, it is harder to measure inequity—a feeling that results from the combination of global and local circumstance, which takes hold for different reasons at different stages, depending on culture and timing. Some argue that perceptions of unfairness may become more widespread when information is more widely held, and both political and economic conditions are in flux. These are the conditions of the current age.²⁹

Four efforts to identify the point at which change leads to violence or societal collapse have been helpful to this inquiry. However, their authors make no claims that their results are either complete or conclusive. The State Failure Task Force has examined a number of variables in order to understand their contribution to state collapse. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has looked at a variety of contributors to mass violence. The former found that lack of material well-being and nonparticipation in the international economic order were key variables. The latter found that deprivation and discrimination combined to prompt violent conflict. A third initiative, undertaken by Thomas Homer-Dixon and his University of Toronto colleagues, has taken a series of case studies of violent conflicts—such as Rwanda and Chiapas, Mexico—and considered the ways in which resource pressures may have interacted with political and social stresses. The University of Toronto team has since begun measuring the impact of and requirements for human “ingenuity”—or the role of indigenous knowledge—in steadying an otherwise fragile state. The fourth effort, launched by the Brookings Institute/Johns Hopkins University Center on Social and Economic Dynamics, is working backward from both conflicts and non-conflicts, to determine why different outcomes occur in situations that might, at first glance, appear quite similar, and how social conditions within societies affect these different outcomes.

Recently, efforts have been made to draw together the many strands that fall within the “redefining security” debate first launched by Professor Ullman in 1983.³⁰ The literature frequently offers a picture of the kaleidoscope’s pieces in motion—all a jumble, with no clear image to see or design to comprehend. At moments a pattern emerges, only to give way to yet another. In such a time of change, traditional measures of success or failure may not apply to a foundation program or a funded project. Capturing change in motion once, twice, and yet again will only prove useful over time, and the inquiry is still young.

During the early and mid-1990s, several promising projects failed to gain enough financial support or academic interest to be sustained. Some aspired to a policy consensus the basis for which did not, and does not yet, exist. The principal investigators did not meet their own ambitious goals, nor those of their funders. In one case, a foundation rescinded a substantial grant.³¹ Nonetheless, in important ways, these were not failures. Each provided insights and inspired others to join a nascent debate on the nature of security and sustainability in a new age.

4. Applying the Knowledge: New Policy Ideas and Mechanisms

Foundations have played a key role in supporting efforts to develop new policy ideas and mechanisms and to advance consideration of these innovations among policy-makers. The Carnegie Corporation’s Cooperative Security Consortium and the

²⁹ See remarks of John Steinbruner at the April 1998 meeting of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on World Security Core Group, www.rbf.org/pws.

³⁰ For example, the Japan Center for International Exchange has held workshops and commissioned a series of regionally focused literature reviews. The Aspen Institute sponsored a series of conferences intended to strengthen the international community’s capacity to address new challenges and to build a consensus on approaches to security among a diverse group including political and financial leaders, scholars, and journalists. The Stimson Center and Overseas Development Council conducted a similar review with Ford Foundation support. The Council on Foreign Relations sponsored a project intended to help develop a broad consensus about how recent changes affect national security. These projects were funded by, among others, the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Family Fund.

³¹ Pew Charitable Trusts rescinded a multi-year grant in the early 1990s.

Rockefeller Foundation's North Korea Initiative are two important examples of projects that helped develop and apply novel approaches to contemporary policy problems. A third example, in the environmental field, is the advancement of "joint implementation" as a means of achieving the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The principal investigators of the Cooperative Security Consortium regularly briefed U.S. Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) on their findings, leading to a partnership that resulted in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act, a policy innovation which committed taxpayer dollars to drawing down former Soviet military forces. This policy tool is a key example of a new trend, described by former Defense Secretary William J. Perry as a strategy of "preventive defense."³² The strategy aims to protect U.S. interests through multilateral action and by cooperatively financing or directly carrying out tasks that reduce threats emanating from abroad. In the case of the Nunn-Lugar program, former Soviet warheads were separated from missiles and transported to secure Russian sites by U.S. corporate contractors who were paid out of the federal defense budget. Those sites have been rendered more secure by technical experts from the U.S. Department of Energy and the Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories.

A second example of "preventive defense" in action is the decision by the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean governments to provide North Korea with fuel oil and light water reactors for nuclear power generation in exchange for agreement to close down the North Korean nuclear weapons program and submit to international safeguards in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Significantly, this too was in part enabled by foundation-supported activity. The Rockefeller Foundation supported a number of efforts at back-channel, or Track II, diplomacy, including a visit by former President Jimmy Carter, which revealed a willingness on North Korea's part to resolve the crisis in this manner.³³ Secretary Perry describes "preventive defense" as an operational expression of the concept of "cooperative security" mentioned above.³⁴

The notion of one state operating within the borders of another or financing such efforts in order to fulfill its governance responsibilities is reflected in yet another policy innovation, known as joint implementation. Through this mechanism, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change allows wealthy countries to meet their required cuts in emissions of greenhouse gases by reducing emissions in less-developed countries.

Other foundation efforts to export knowledge have included the sharing and dissemination of "best practices." The Ford Foundation in particular has focused on distilling the strategies or policies that have proven successful in one arena, transferring them to another geographic or functional area. One of the most celebrated and successful initiatives that gave momentum to the notion of sharing best practices was micro-lending. Its success in Bangladesh with the Grameen Bank has spread globally and has even been adopted as a method for alleviating poverty in the developed world.³⁵ In recent years, American First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton has brought media attention to this economic tool, in an example of a political leader seeking to encourage nongovernmental actors and to help others learn from them. Similarly, many conflict prevention and resolution initiatives adopted or encouraged

³² Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter co-direct the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, a joint venture of the two universities. In a forthcoming book, they explain their concept and make recommendations for U.S. defense policy. By engaging Stanford scholar Perry, Harvard scholar Carter, and ISKAN scholar Andrei Kokoshin in the Cooperative Security Consortium, Carnegie was able to involve those who would later be responsible for implementing the Nunn-Lugar program within both the U.S. and Russian ministries of defense.

³³ For a detailed description of events leading to the North Korean "framework agreement," see Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, N.J.: 1998).

³⁴ While debates continue on the wisdom or relevance of conceptual innovations, former Defense Secretary William J. Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter have begun a series of books outlining the ways in which they applied cooperative security concepts while in office. Adding to the power of their persuasion is the contribution of young scholars such as Harvard and Oxford-educated Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, who also served in the Pentagon. Their Preventive Defense Project has invited others of stature and imagination—such as former National Security Advisor and Air Force General Brent Scowcroft, former Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, former Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs Admiral William Owens, and former Senator Sam Nunn—to join in the effort to apply a model that works for today's problems. The combination of young scholars and established leaders can contribute to a larger consensus. Part of their Stanford/Harvard Project on Preventive Defense are active efforts to encourage China to define its security goals in ways that are compatible with those of its neighbors and other Great Powers. See Perry and Carter, *The Content of U.S. Engagement with China: A Special report of the Preventive Defense Project* (California: by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University and the Board of Trustees of Harvard University, 1998).

³⁵ Among the concerns about the financial crisis that swept Asia in 1998 was that the Grameen Bank suffered heavy losses, threatening continued "micro-lending."

³⁶ Many relief organizations, like CARE, are engaged in conflict prevention and management. Other organizations like the Washington DC-based Search for Common Ground or the Boston-based Conflict Management Group have been active in this arena as well.

by states are built on models that CSOs have tested and shown to be effective.³⁶ And efforts by CSOs like the Nautilus and the Rocky Mountain Institutes to offer energy alternatives to North Korea and China may pave the way for future intergovernmental cooperation.³⁷

Another project applying the lessons of one arena to another is being carried out by University of Virginia scholar Philip Zelikow. His experience as a former National Security Council staff-member, a Texas prosecutor, and as a political scientist prompted him to seek a “third way” of policing in societies fraught by internal conflict, such as Northern Ireland or Palestine. His findings reflect recent experience—both successful and not—and will be useful to those responsible for the civil administration of states torn by civil war, such as the former Yugoslavia. Foundations rightly focus on those problems that are likely to arise for which solutions are urgently needed. Professor Zelikow’s project is illustrative of the policy-relevant research carried out in universities and think tanks around the world.

5. Support for Interaction Among Policy-Makers and Independent Experts

Foundations that have shifted their gaze to transnational issues are both influencing and influenced by the think tanks, academic institutions, and activists they support, and they reflect many of the concerns of policy-makers. Their support of policy-relevant research is essential to expanding the options available to governments and to creating the talent pool upon which governments draw.

Several foundations have sought to advance both new ideas and new methods of analysis by systematically engaging policy-makers and elected officials in discussions with scholars and activists. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Carnegie Corporation and the W. Alton Jones Foundation supported a Washington dinner series to discuss long-term “Security Options” among their grantees and officials from the legislative and executive branches of government.³⁸ MacArthur and Carnegie have supported Congressional seminars convened by former Senator Dick Clark of the Aspen Institute, in which U.S. and other legislators and scholars devote a week to the discussion of issues relating to U.S.-Russian relations, China’s future, the global environment, or the transition to post-apartheid South Africa. These foundations and others have supported the Aspen Strategy Group, an annual, week-long session of current, past, and likely future senior officials to discuss papers put forth by outstanding scholars with area and functional expertise.³⁹ Consortia like the Common Security Forum and the Cooperative Security Consortium were comprised of an international grouping of policy-makers and scholars. These are just some of the ways in which foundations have supported interaction and collaboration among state and non-state actors.

Foundations have also used their own convening authority to promote discussion and collaboration among scholars, activists, and governmental policy-makers. For example, several foundations are now working closely with representatives of the World Bank, the United Nations, and other multilateral organizations not only to improve communication among policy-makers and independent analysts, but also to identify new ways of doing business.⁴⁰ Foundations are in a position to urge action, for example, on the State Failure Task Force’s recommendation that there be better collection of environmental and census data worldwide.

³⁷ Energy experts Amory and Hunter Lovins of the Colorado-based Rocky Mountain Institute have been advising Chinese officials on ways to meet their energy needs while minimizing the environmental impact. Private sector energy experts Roger Sant of AES Corporation and William Chandler of Battelle are also among those advising the Chinese on sustainable development models.

³⁸ This project was first created by the late Gerard Smith, Jane Wales, and Morton Halperin under the auspices of the Center for Nuclear War Education of the New York and Washington-based Fund for Peace. It was later was convened by William Lanouette and Steven Wolf at the Henry L. Stimson Center. In both incarnations, it was supported by the Carnegie Corporation and the W. Alton Jones Foundation.

³⁹ This undertaking is also carried out under the umbrella of the Aspen Institute, headquartered in Washington, D.C.

⁴⁰ Through a project at the Aspen Institute called the Global Interdependence Initiative, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and several other U.S.-based foundations have been pooling resources to advance U.S. public understanding of the reality and consequences of global interdependence.

B. SUPPORT FOR STATE ACTORS

⁴¹ See Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 5 (Fall 1977). The Carnegie Corporation, under the leadership of its president, Vartan Gregorian, has identified strengthening democracy as a central theme that will cut across its domestic and international programs. The Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, MacArthur, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund have all devoted significant funds to strengthening democratic governance. This has long been a goal of the Ford Foundation, for example, in the developing world. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund has sought to build and strengthen emerging democratic institutions in East Central Europe, East Asia, South Africa, and Latin America. And an important strand of the Carnegie Corporation's grant-making in former Warsaw Pact countries has fallen under the rubric of "Strengthening Democratic Institutions." An aspect of strengthening democratic governance also has included support for watch-dog organizations, which monitor the policies and actions of governments and intergovernmental organizations. The human rights community, for example, has received support for this purpose from a wide range of foundations, as have the nonproliferation community and environmental organizations. Grantee organizations such as the University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security seek to strengthen international regimes by monitoring the effectiveness of their associated international institutions. Others, like the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, aim to strengthen multilateral institutions by identifying ways to improve internal governance and financing.

⁴² This training program was funded by several foundations, including the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and the W. Alton Jones Foundation. It is only one facet of Monterey's research program; others include the International Organizations and Non-Proliferation Project; Monitoring Proliferation Threats; the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion; the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation Project; and the East Asia Non-Proliferation Project. The center also receives funding from the U.S. Government.

⁴³ The Chinese program is part of the Nina Kung Initiative at the Kennedy School; its goal is to advance the principle of civilian control of the military. The Russian generals program, on which it is modeled, has received significant Carnegie Corporation support. Both are designed and carried out by Robert Blackwill, a senior director of the National Security Council in the Bush Administration.

By financing the scholarship and creating the talent pool upon which governments draw, foundations have helped to expand policy options and strengthen the efficacy of governments. They have done so both in the developed and the developing world. Recognizing the importance of the virtues of accountability, transparency, and agility in an era characterized by change, foundations have also supported efforts to build democratic institutions. The Ford Foundation has backed programs to draft constitutions and train independent judiciaries throughout the world. The Carnegie Corporation has sought to strengthen democratic institutions ranging from popularly elected legislatures to the media, and has focused on the role of the military in emerging democracies. The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation has supported efforts to build capacity for conflict prevention and management on the local as well as national and regional levels. And financier George Soros's many Open Society Institutes have helped promote openness in governance in the former Soviet sphere.

Foundation support for collaboration among governmental institutions and officials with like responsibilities, across state lines, has been so pervasive and so effective over the years that Harvard legal scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that a new transgovernmental order is emerging. According to Slaughter, the state is disaggregating into functionally separate parts, including courts, regulatory agencies, and legislatures. These distinct entities join with their counterparts abroad, forming networks that can collaboratively seek to address transnational problems.⁴⁴

In recent years, research institutes and private individuals have also recognized the need to encourage and augment government efforts to train personnel in the principles of democratic governance, as well as for the tasks of enforcing international regulations. One example is the program to train nonproliferation specialists in the former Soviet Union and China, particularly in the area of export control implementation established by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.⁴² Another is the Chinese Generals Program at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, which is funded by a Hong Kong businesswoman. Notably, she chose to initiate this program because of the success of a similar foundation-funded program to train Russian officers at the Kennedy School.⁴³ The Carnegie Corporation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the W. Alton Jones Foundation are all investing in formalized contact among military bureaucracies.

Foundations are also seeking to improve governance by addressing the decline in trust in public institutions and by identifying the most important trends affecting governments. The Kennedy School's Vision in Governance Project has initiated a public conversation to develop appropriate responses to, and new ways of thinking about, governance as well as the expectations citizens have of their governments. The Project also focuses attention on new paradigms for national security policy and social policy, as well as on the means for improving the management and measurement of governance needs and capacities.

Many foundations have selected certain geographic areas as a way of concentrating their efforts. The end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid in South Africa presented foundations with new opportunities to support and encourage societies in transition, provide a safety net, and limit reliance on the use of force. The William

and Flora Hewlett Foundation has developed a special interest in Latin America. The Carnegie Corporation's charter has long focused its attention on British Commonwealth countries in Africa. Carnegie has also concentrated on the successor states of the Soviet Union and has a new interest in Central Asia. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund's traditional areas of concern have included East Asia, East Central Europe, South Africa, and New York City. The Ford, MacArthur, and Rockefeller Foundations tend to be global in their orientation. However, even these global players can point to areas they have emphasized or periods in which they became more focused on a certain region. The Rockefeller Foundation, after its work on the Green Revolution, has continued its activities in the developing world. Ford has seen Africa as a major concern. And MacArthur has become particularly active in the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War.⁴⁴ Several foundations supported Yale historian Paul Kennedy's development of a theoretic "pivotal states" strategy for the U.S. government to focus its development dollars on those states whose stability is central to the stability of the region they inhabit. While those foundations do not claim to adhere to that policy, in practice funding and staffing limitations often mandate clear geographic foci. The same is true for governments, including the U.S.⁴⁵

C. SUPPORT FOR NON-STATE ACTORS

In recognition that an accountable and stable state is the political unit best equipped to protect the basic rights and provide for the security of individuals and groups, the targets of foundation efforts have often been states. However, funding has gone to independent experts and nongovernmental organizations that strengthen state capacity by enhancing the transparency, accountability, and efficacy of governmental institutions. This has included efforts to bring to light previously secret governmental decisions and the processes that led to them.⁴⁶ Furthermore, foundation leaders firmly subscribe to the notion that a robust civil society is fundamental to a functioning democratic state. Support for civil society organizations and their interaction with counterparts around the world has been a staple of foundation strategies for decades.

Many large foundations have funded nongovernmental think tanks that have generated alternative analyses of economic and security issues so that neither policy-makers nor citizens would have to rely solely on governmental perspectives of issues that are technically complex or shrouded in secrecy. Ford, MacArthur, and Carnegie have supported "centers of excellence" where arms control issues are considered at universities such as Harvard, Stanford, and MIT. Foundations have also begun to support the creation of similar institutions in other countries where they perceive a need for an independent voice in the security realm. One example is the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment, which supports independent Russian scholars and policy analysts.

They have also supported collaboration among "agents of change" or social entrepreneurs who are setting local, national, and international agendas. Important examples of such key actors include transnational epistemic communities, such as the science and technology community. For over forty years, foundations have supported the Nobel Prize-winning International Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, an international gathering of scientists concerned about issues related to weapons of mass destruction. In the early 1980s, the Carnegie Corporation launched its Commission on Science, Technology and Government, which examined the many

⁴⁴ Foundations publish their guidelines in hard copy and on-line, including a description of their geographic areas of concentration.

⁴⁵ See Paul M. Kennedy, *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for US Policy in the Developing World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998).

⁴⁶ A number of organizations within the United States and elsewhere promote transparency in foreign policy decision-making. An outstanding example is the National Security Archives of the Fund for Peace, which uses the Freedom of Information Act to seek the declassification of government documents. It publishes those documents, along with an analysis of related issues and events. Other contributions come in the form of "living histories," such as the efforts by Brown University scholar James Blight to convene key decision-makers in the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam conflict to review and discuss the conditions, beliefs, and thought processes that guided their actions (See James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993)). A third approach is pursued by organizations that provide a forum and legal representation for government "whistle blowers," who publicly criticize or challenge decisions taken by their agency.

ways in which the science and technology community interacts with the policy world and made recommendations on ways to enhance society's benefits from this interaction.⁴⁷ At the same time, the Corporation's Human Resources in Developing Countries program focused its resources on indigenous African scientific communities and African women; its Program on Cooperative Security had as a specific goal the strengthening of the science and technology community in the Soviet Union and its successor states

⁴⁷ For Commission publications, see www.carnegie.org.

⁴⁸ Scientists worked together under the auspices of the Federation of American Scientists and the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat. Among the lead organizers was Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel, who later helped devise the U.S. government's approach to securing nuclear weapons material in the former Soviet Union as Assistant Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Clinton Administration. Assisting him was Matthew Bunn, now at Harvard's Kennedy School.

⁴⁹ Recognizing the role of the scientific community in promoting social, political, and economic reform, the Carnegie Corporation, the Soros Foundations Network, and the MacArthur Foundation have funded projects in the former Soviet Union which support scientists and engineers, as well as projects which devise and carry out plans for defense conversion and sustainable economic development.

⁵⁰ Both the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund have funded the Institute for East-West Studies' TransCarpathia Project, designed to promote economic development and cross-border cooperation in the Carpathian Mountain region of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine.

⁵¹ The U.S. government recently created the U.S.-Russian Civilian Research and Development (R&D) Foundation and the U.S.-Ukrainian R&D Foundation. The Soros group emphasized strengthening the scientific community in the former Soviet Union, creating a small direct grants program in the former Soviet Union. And Soros matched the U.S. government's contribution to the U.S.-Russian Civilian R&D Foundation. George Perkovich of the W. Alton Jones Foundation now argues for an independent scientific voice in states like India and Pakistan, one which would call for a reduction of the nuclear danger and spell out ways for doing so, much as the U.S. and Soviet communities did during Gorbachev's era.

⁵² The U.S. government's 1995 National Security Science and Technology Strategy advanced the view that sustainable development abroad promotes national security and economic prosperity at home. See www.whitehouse.gov/White_House/EOP/OSTP/nssts. The document is offered in hard copy by the United States Government Printing Office.

⁵³ The Packard, Rockefeller, Hewlett, and MacArthur foundations are among them.

After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the mid-1980s, Carnegie joined the W. Alton Jones and MacArthur foundations in supporting a group of U.S. and Soviet scientists that served as a brain trust to the Soviet president, developing options for nuclear arms control and disarmament.⁴⁸ All three foundations supported the Natural Resources Defense Council's path-breaking experimentation with verification techniques. And several foundations have provided funding for the National Academy of Sciences and its collaboration with counterparts abroad. After the fall of Communism, both the Soros network of foundations and MacArthur provided steady support to scientists in the former Soviet Union, although Soros's International Science Foundations recently have been phased out. The U.S. Government used Nunn-Lugar funds to create the Moscow-based Civilian Research and Development Foundation to finance civilian research by scientists from the Russian military establishment. That funding has been augmented by smaller contributions from both Carnegie and MacArthur.

Foundations have supported efforts to link scientists, CSO activists, and government officials in various informal ways as well.⁴⁹ The Rockefeller Foundation has contributed to such pragmatic endeavors, especially through efforts to establish and nurture informal and Track II contacts in areas where the presence of nuclear weapons capabilities may exacerbate potential tensions. These efforts are intended both to prepare the ground for official cooperation and, more generally, to expand and improve communication across borders.⁵⁰

This support has coincided with efforts by governments, such as the United States, to augment or replace traditional aid programs with the establishment of bilateral science and technology foundations in places as diverse as India, Russia, and Mexico.⁵¹ The Clinton administration set out the U.S.'s first coherent strategy of comprehensive science and technology cooperation with countries whose success was central to the stability of their region in a document entitled "The National Security Science and Technology Strategy."⁵² In doing so, it linked its security and sustainable economic development agendas. What is notable about recent foundation efforts, however, is that the rationale of a "human security" suggests a more coherent and conscious strategy. And the widespread recognition of the science and technology community's role has made this approach more pervasive among foundations and U.S. government agencies.

But scientists are not the only "agents of change" attracting foundation and government funding. Those in the economic development field note that women are the engines of economic growth throughout the developing world. Carnegie Corporation's attention to the status of women in Africa reflects this understanding. And foundations concerned about population stabilization have devoted funds to advancing women's education and supporting international networks of women.⁵³

The labor and human rights movements have also received steady support and can claim significant international policy impact. Funding for their efforts has come from the Ford, Olin, Smith Richardson, Bradley, and MacArthur foundations, and the Soros Foundations Network, among others. The Soros group has established a well-developed rationale for its efforts to nurture open societies by arguing that openness is integral to the flow of knowledge needed to adapt and improve the quality of governance within and among all human associations.⁵⁴

D. SUPPORT FOR INDIGENOUS PHILANTHROPY

Furthermore, in recognition that philanthropy itself has increased in importance due to the relative decline of the state, some foundations and individual donors are working to encourage indigenous philanthropy in countries around the globe.⁵⁵ The United States government is also establishing regionally focused foundations to carry out programs designed to build and strengthen civil society abroad.⁵⁶ However, funding for such efforts is meager and often represents a reduction in overall U.S. financial and technical support for building capacity overseas.

Finally, foundations have sought to strengthen non-state actors through awards that bring international recognition to their achievements, as well as providing needed funds to further their work. The Nobel Committee has awarded its Peace Prize to Amnesty International, Pugwash, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), and the leadership of the movement to ban anti-personnel land mines, for example. The Goldman Environmental Prize, offered by the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Foundation, is another example, as are the fellowships—known as “genius awards”—granted by the MacArthur Foundation. In all three cases, the awardees are thoroughly vetted by an international network of experts. The Carnegie Corporation is planning its own program of individual fellowships.

E. SUPPORT FOR TRANSNATIONAL REGIMES

Through support for state and non-state actors, foundations have played key roles in advancing regimes to address global problems with practical and positive effect. In the 1960s, foundations supported the environmental and anti-nuclear movements, which led to the Clean Air Act and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In the 1980s, philanthropic attention turned to the Nuclear Weapons Freeze campaign, which led to strategic arms reductions (START) and the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). More recently, foundations have supported groups that have promoted the advancement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the United Nations Framework Convention on Global Climate Change (FCCC), and the Montreal Protocol.

Recently, several foundations supported organizations involved in the campaign to ban land mines.⁵⁷ Those citizen groups were recognized with the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to one of their leaders, Jodie Williams. And efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons have been supported by foundations such as W. Alton Jones, MacArthur, and Rockefeller, as well as the Carnegie Corporation and the Ploughshares Fund. Their grantees have been similarly collaborative, coordinating their activities through the Committee on Nuclear Policy, housed in and staffed by the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ See, for example, George Soros, “The Capitalist Threat,” *Atlantic Monthly* 279, no. 2, pp. 45–48.

⁵⁵ The Rockefeller Brothers Fund has helped to convene new philanthropists in Asia to share best practices. Other grant-makers have created foundations abroad. This has not always been smooth sailing. In the early 1990s, a group of U.S. grant-makers created an international foundation to develop intellectual ties with reformers in what was then the Soviet Union. To the disappointment of its patrons, the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity carried out its business in a sometimes capricious and secretive fashion, reflecting the norms of the Soviet elite. This experience may be a warning that democratic institutions cannot be fully formed in an undemocratic state. It also underscores the advantage of a foundation’s on-the-ground presence when investing overseas. Grant-makers with their own programs in the Soviet Union—such as MacArthur—had greater success directly managing grant-making. And once communism collapsed and democracy was embraced, financier George Soros’s Open Society Institutes (OSIs) were able to thrive as models of transparency throughout the former Warsaw Pact nations. The Civilian R&D Foundation in Russia has been similarly successful.

⁵⁶ These include the U.S.-Russian Civilian R&D Foundation and the Baltic-American Partnership Fund, mentioned above, and the Congressionally-funded Eurasia Foundation.

⁵⁷ These included the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund, among others.

⁵⁸ A listing of their grantees is available at www.stimson.org/policy/members.htm.

⁵⁹ The Ford Foundation has placed the previously autonomous International Affairs Program under its Peace and Social Justice category. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation has recently merged its separate population, peace and security, and conservation programs into one program with cross-cutting themes. Importantly, both maintain their interest in the control of advanced weapons. And Ford has supported efforts to contain the light weapons trade.

⁶⁰ Both foundations have worked to alleviate poverty. The Ford Foundation also seeks to promote peace, the rule of law, human rights, and individual freedoms.

⁶¹ Both documents are published by the United States Government Printing Office and are available on the White House home page. The *National Security Strategy* is updated and submitted to Congress annually. The Clinton administration's 1995 *National Security Science and Technology Strategy* was the country's first, and was the result of an interagency process, which also engaged independent scholars from around the country. It can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/White_House/EOP/OSTP/nssts/html/nssts.html. Undersecretary of State Timothy Wirth spoke frequently to the importance of sustainable economic development while in office. He is now president of the United Nations Foundation.

⁶² The W. Alton Jones Foundation is a leader in this field. At a time when other foundations showed a declining interest in issues relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear war, it has expanded its support for individuals and organizations committed to reducing the nuclear danger. For a listing of its current grantees, see www.wajones.org. The Ploughshares Fund has also maintained its commitment to this issue.

⁶³ Among those concerned with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and the Ploughshares Fund. While they have maintained their interest in the issue, others have not, and the overall funding for nonproliferation efforts has fallen off at a time when the risk of proliferation appears to have risen.

⁶⁴ Among these are the Olin Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Bradley Foundation, the Joyce Mertz Gilmore Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, all of which have supported research on regional threats to security.

⁶⁵ The Nuclear Policy Committee, supported by the W. Alton Jones Foundation and housed at the Henry L. Stimson Center, provides a model for systematic consultation among grantee organizations and individual scholars. In some cases, foundation officers suggest or require such cooperation as a condition for funding. More often, the grantees themselves choose to work closely together and seek funding to support that collaboration.

A project aimed at understanding transnational policy challenges is the Carnegie Endowment's project on Managing Global Issues convened by P.J. Simmons and supported by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and others. Its goals are to compare transnational mechanisms and policies over a range of global issues in order to identify lessons from each area and to evaluate whether they are applicable elsewhere; to build a network of scholars who examine global issues; and to share the results with both scholars and policy-makers in order to strengthen both practice and research in this area.

F. INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING AND ADAPTATION IN U.S.-BASED FOUNDATIONS

Foundations based in the United States have adapted their own programs and internal structures to reflect new global conditions, while sustaining support for the study and management of ongoing problems. Some foundations, such as the Ford Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, have merged previously separate programs and identified cross-cutting themes, in recognition of the breakdown of barriers between domestic and international issues and the need for an integrated approach to the goals of security, sustainability, and improved quality of life.⁵⁹ Like the MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund has treated security and sustainability as mutually reinforcing goals to be promoted and pursued in targeted regions of the globe where it has a traditional interest or the issues appear most salient. The Ford and Rockefeller foundations take advantage of their strong and historic presence on the ground, working through regional field offices staffed by outstanding area and functional experts.⁶⁰ The Rockefeller Foundation has created a new program to advance understanding of global issues. And the Carnegie Corporation has developed a new strand of grant-making devoted to the "new dimensions of security." It has also identified the cross-cutting goal of advancing democracy to be applied to its education, economic development, and peace and security programs. At the same time, the assets of foundations such as Packard have grown substantially, prompting a reexamination of programs. The restructuring of foundation programs and restatement of goals mirrors changes within the U.S. government structure as well as official statements. In the mid-1990s, issues such as crime, drugs, health, and the environment, which had previously been treated as domestic policy concerns, fell under the purview of the National Security Council staff and were cited as central themes in the Clinton administration's National Security Strategy document and its National Security Science and Technology Strategy.⁶¹ The notion of *transnational* issues, actors, and concerns had become a part of the thinking and planning of governments, foundations, and the intellectual leaders with whom they interact.

While some grant-making institutions have found advantage in broadening their focus, others have chosen to narrow the lens, giving singular attention to a clear and concrete objective, such as the reduction of the nuclear danger,⁶² stemming weapons proliferation,⁶³ or identifying and addressing other direct threats to security in particular conflict-ridden regions of the world, such as the Middle East, South Asia, or the Korean Peninsula.⁶⁴ They have dedicated a portion of their grant-making to the support of scholars, activists, and organizations with expertise in, and a commitment to these issues. In some cases, they have supported coalitions among like-minded institutions and individuals working toward a common goal.⁶⁵ Other

foundations have chosen to pool their resources, creating re-granting mechanisms for specific purposes. The Global Interdependence Initiative launched by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and others is a current example. Some foundations have conducted reviews or studies designed to better understand the nature of threats to peace and stability, to evaluate options for addressing these threats, and to identify grant-making priorities.⁶⁶ Others have supported similar studies carried out by grantee organizations and research groups.⁶⁷ The Carnegie Corporation, by creating its Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in parallel with a grant-making program, has done both, providing intellectual leadership and attracting media attention, as well as providing financial support for independent study, analysis, and experimentation.⁶⁸

The establishment of the United Nations Foundation by media executive Ted Turner is an important development as well: an example of a private actor stepping into a vacuum left by states.⁶⁹ The stated aim of this foundation is to support the goals and objectives of the United Nations, with special emphasis on the UN's work on behalf of economic, social, environmental, and humanitarian causes.⁷⁰ Turner is one of many new philanthropists whose business interests give them both an entrepreneurial and a global perspective, and who are seeking new partners. Many of the architects and the beneficiaries of the information revolution, for example, have established new foundations.⁷¹ This new generation is often more engaged in the activities of its grantees and frequently sets clear benchmarks for success or failure. Established funders worry that newcomers to the field may not appreciate the degree to which social change and policy impact are long-term objectives, requiring some degree of patience and the occasional leap of faith.⁷²

. . .

Foundations and their partners have established a solid base upon which to build. Nonetheless, even the most forward-looking foundations and those they support find themselves striving to keep pace with an accelerating rate of change. Change is so rapid and so large in scale that it is more easily captured by the snapshot of journalistic reporting than by in-depth scholarly analysis. Governmental leaders have less time to reflect and react during crises, and scholars are hard-pressed to keep up with new information. On a more positive note, facts about events are now transmitted within hours, informing journalists, scholars, and activists—and also eliminating the shadows within which governments and guerillas operated with relative impunity.⁷³ Recognizing that the pace of change is only likely to quicken in the future, foundation officers have placed greater emphasis on promoting collaboration among non-state actors, governments, and multilateral institutions to address global challenges, in order to develop the agility to influence events and to head off emerging dangers.

⁶⁶ Foundations that have recently conducted their own evaluations include the Carnegie Corporation through its Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; the Rockefeller Brothers Fund through its Project on World Security; the Pew Charitable Trusts through its review of its Public Policy Program; and the Henry P. Kendall Foundation.

⁶⁷ Such projects include the Global Trends 2005 Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); the Pew Charitable Trusts' funding of the Council on Foreign Relations study on America's national interests; the Ford Foundation-supported Henry L. Stimson Center/Overseas Development Council study and report on "The Leadership Imperative: Maintaining American Leadership in the New Era"; the Aspen Institute's project on "rethinking security," and many others.

⁶⁸ Unlike many foundation initiatives, the Commission took the risk of making policy recommendations and was criticized by those who disagreed with the findings. Some argued that the CCPDC was too bold; others asserted that its recommendations were too timid. For the Commission publications, see www.carnegie.org.

⁶⁹ Both the United Nations Foundation and the Soros Foundations Network fall into this category.

⁷⁰ According to United Nations Foundation President Timothy Wirth, Turner originally planned to pay the U.S. arrears and then sue the Congress for the funds, only to learn from his attorneys that he would not have legal standing.

⁷¹ Some have pooled their resources in community foundations such as Community Foundation Silicon Valley. Others, such as the many youthful retirees from Microsoft, Charles Schwab & Company, and other successful firms, have created their own foundations. That is true of current employees of these and other firms as well. Schwab encourages philanthropy and volunteerism on the part of its employees, offering a two-for-one match for donations to charitable organizations and underwriting their volunteer activities.

⁷² Some professionals versed in the ways of established foundations have reached out to this new school. Peter Goldmark, while president of Rockefeller Foundation, invited new philanthropists to travel with him to visit grantees abroad. Steven Rockefeller, Jr., at Bankers Trust Private Banking, has helped guide new funders. And the W. Alton Jones Foundation has supported former Ploughshares Fund director Wayne Jaquith's efforts to persuade successful entrepreneurs to become donors.

⁷³ See Jessica T. Matthews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1997).

PART III: INVESTING IN THE FUTURE

Grant-makers have found that information-driven integration both enables and requires cooperation and social innovation at all levels of human activity to ensure that societies can manage and adapt to the transformation underway. The challenge facing foundations is to devise a grant-making strategy for world security and stewardship that captures the benefits and meets the challenges posed by this new age. Such a strategy would aim to strengthen and extend the governing capability of states and CSOs by embedding them in collaborative arrangements for the peaceful management of change. It would encourage increased cooperation and innovation. And it would help others to construct regimes that rely on a combination of governmental and nongovernmental actors, with the mantle of leadership shifting from one to the other according to the task at hand.

Grant-making institutions have played a vital role in strengthening the governing capability of state and non-state actors by supporting academic and policy-relevant research, practical experimentation, and public education. This section offers a four-part grant-making strategy, which builds on the accomplishments and experiences of recent philanthropy and argues that foundation support for greater collaboration and invention is urgently needed.

Note that while space limitations require that only a few grantees be named in this document, it is those whose names are not yet known, whose work may be thus far undiscovered, whom foundation officers are most eager to support. For these professionals in philanthropy recognize that the leaders of today may not be the leaders of tomorrow. A key characteristic of this new age is that no small, easily identified group holds the monopoly on policy or power. New leaders will emerge from unexpected places and in unanticipated ways. Foundations can provide them the resources and community they need to assume their new-found responsibilities.

The four complementary strands of grant-making listed here and described below would comprise an integrated agenda:

- ***Understanding Global Trends***: This first strand is devoted to understanding global trends and their effects. Its purpose is to determine the degree to which the information revolution, economic globalization, and demographic shifts exacerbate or ameliorate traditional and emerging dangers. It would employ new or borrowed tools for measuring the effect of a complex set of interactions. And it would contribute to the development of a conceptual framework that allows practitioners to consider all contributors to conflict and state collapse, treating them as symptoms of a syndrome rather than as separable, isolated, or unimportant events.

- ***Strengthening Global Actors***: This second strand would aim to enhance the accountability, transparency, and agility of both state and non-state actors so that they might collaborate effectively in the peaceful management of change. It would recognize that in the new age these are the attributes of effective governing

institutions and processes. When change is constant, social innovation needs to keep pace with technological innovation.

- ***Effecting New Partnerships*** This third strand would identify and seek to address a transnational danger that cuts across all levels of society and requires a collaborative response. Grant-making would encourage the design and advocacy of a “hybrid” regime for managing the danger. And in so doing, it would create a prototype for a new kind of governance that crosses national and sectoral divides.

- ***Building a Consensus*** This fourth strand would seek to stimulate public discussion of the interests and values that give purpose to public policy. In a time of changing relationships, it is difficult to agree on the principles for which each actor is willing to stand, fight, or pay. The aim, therefore, would be to help all actors better understand their shifting roles and responsibilities and to contribute to a lasting consensus upon which new partnerships and policies can rely.

STRAND #1: UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL TRENDS

The deceptive simplicity of the Cold War has given way to a kaleidoscope of multiple trends and their interactions: technological innovation and economic globalization, population pressures and environmental strain. The goal of foundation-supported scholarship has been to develop a more integrated understanding of these dynamics and their effects, to help identify the kaleidoscopic patterns, as the pieces fall together, come apart, and combine once again.

In response to the many facets of the kaleidoscope’s images, policy-makers have begun to consider threats that are spontaneous as well as organized, indigenous as well as foreign. Some fear that what is at risk is no longer simply territorial integrity, or even national values—but order itself. They have focused their attention on challenges posed to governance at all levels. Most recognize that stasis cannot be maintained, and instead, seek

- useable knowledge that will help them to anticipate change, and
- practical experimentation to develop effective mechanisms for governing.

At the same time they have begun to adopt new concepts—ones that accommodate the actual dangers and choices they face.

Generating Knowledge

Despite the rich array of research undertaken in the past several years, the precise ways in which interacting stresses combine to create a crisis is not apparent. Many policy-makers maintain that the “tipping point” is the moment at which traditional institutions and processes of governance break down, inequity is perceived, and an opportunistic leader emerges who is willing to exploit frustrated hopes and expectations for political gain. This was certainly the case in the Balkans.

But practitioners generally argue that, while further research is needed to better understand the connections among social change, conflict, and state collapse, it is unlikely to yield precise predictors of the conditions under which this moment will occur.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Many researchers note that indicators cannot always be distinguished from causes. And it is not clear whether a given factor causes or coincides with an outcome.

Furthermore, policy-makers do not realistically expect nor may they require such precise knowledge in order to act and act effectively. Indeed some view the search for the “tipping point” as a distraction from efforts to build the basis for a workable and shared policy agenda.⁷⁵ Whether stated or unstated, explicit or implicit, policy-makers’ paradigms have begun to shift as new evidence is offered and opportunities for action weighed. Practitioners and scholars may not know the precise correlation between a variety of social ills and conflict. But decision-makers have come to operate within a framework that allows them to consider all contributors to conflict and state collapse—and to treat them as symptoms of a syndrome, rather than as isolated, separable, or unimportant events.

From Practice to Concepts and Vice Versa

To better understand the relationship of current practice to theory, foundations might choose as a starting point a systematic review of the degree to which new concepts of “cooperative,” “human,” “environmental,” or “economic” security have already seeped into decision-making. For example, the Henry L. Stimson Center proposes and is well positioned to conduct a study of the ways in which the concept of cooperative security have been tested and applied. Its analysts can build upon the series of literature reviews already commissioned by the Japan Center for International Exchanges (JCIE). The resulting report⁷⁶ reveals the differing degrees to which new conceptions of security and sustainability have become a part of public and elite consciousness in Asia, Latin America, Europe, Eurasia, Africa, and North America—documenting important regional and cultural differences.⁷⁷

Foundations might encourage others—who combine scholarship, practical experience and a willingness to be bold—to go beyond documentation to prescription, offering recommendations for the future. Consensus for these recommendations will be most easily achieved if the effort is international from the onset and includes scholars, private sector actors, and governmental policy-makers, bearing in mind the JCIE’s findings.

A Focus on Governance

These efforts would contribute to an understanding of the requirements of governance in a new age, for the impacts of political, economic, environmental, and technological change on social cohesion or conflict are yet to be fully understood. Many argue that transnational trends have the potential to integrate communities around the globe, allowing a new and stable design to emerge. Those who are less optimistic, however, note that an equally plausible consequence is an increasing separation into two worlds—one made up of participants in global society, and the other of those who have opted out or who have been left behind.

Most agree that the processes of globalization and fragmentation are taking place simultaneously, causing continual shifts in the kaleidoscope’s images. Both George Washington University scholar James Rosenau and Rutgers University scholar Benjamin Barber are among those who have written on these twin effects. The debate continues and has inspired a growth in research into the impact of rapid change on sovereignty and citizenship the world over.⁷⁸

This focus on globalization and governance has been of particular interest to a cadre of young scholars in think tanks in major capitals and in Western schools of public

⁷⁵ See Paul B. Stares, “The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey.”

⁷⁶ Stares, “The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey.”

⁷⁷ The cooperative security concept appears to be integrated in Asian security thinking, for example. And throughout the world, economic and environmental considerations have long been linked to security concerns, but perhaps not as systematically or as thoughtfully as scholars might hope. While an academic might demand a rigorous analysis, the practitioner wants to know what will work.

⁷⁸ See James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Also see Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad Vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

policy. A critical mass has begun to emerge in North America.⁷⁹ Foundation support for their work might encourage collaboration with colleagues abroad and with private sector actors, so as to increase understanding of globalization's effects in different cultures and in different sectors.

Multidisciplinary Study: Cross-Sectoral Experimentation

Scholars considering the impact of global trends on governance argue that recognizing emerging patterns requires multidisciplinary study and that acting on them requires cross-sectoral experimentation. Each involves a long-term perspective and a lasting commitment on the part of practitioners, scholars, and the foundations that support them. However, the structure of academic institutions and academic careers does not currently encourage or reward cross-disciplinary inquiry. And the easy movement of scholars back and forth between academe and government or academe and activism is not admired outside of Western capital cities, and not even allowed in many societies. Incentives therefore need to be created and maintained if current structures and norms do not support the intellectual requirements of the age. The focus would be to develop a talent pool on which governments and societies can draw—one that is comfortable working across sectoral, disciplinary, and national divides.⁸⁰

Foundations can build on the success of U.S.-based “centers of excellence” devoted to multidisciplinary research and analysis by helping to create and support similar institutions abroad.⁸¹ Scholars in these U.S. institutions often collaborate with overseas counterparts. Theirs have been important contributions, and society benefits from their sustained support. Similar institutions are needed in cultures where independent policy voices are not often heard. Because of the complexity of overseas grant-making—especially for those foundations without field offices—it may be most prudent to support efforts by Western centers to transform existing collaborative projects into lasting institutional arrangements.⁸² And the addition of international participants to ad hoc consortia, which engage scholars from different institutions and specialties in the joint examination of a specific problem, would also be beneficial. Equally wise would be the involvement of private sector actors who may play a policy role.

Some institutions have been dedicated to research and experimentation that span sectors as well as disciplines. The Sante Fe Institute assembles decision-makers from all levels of government, business and academe to consider multifaceted problems, using complex adaptive systems as a methodological tool.⁸³ New interest in exploiting the capabilities of multiple sectors has yielded the concept of “hybrid” regimes or arrangements of state and non-state actors committed to a joint solution of a shared problem. The regime approach to problem-solving has been discussed in depth by legal scholars Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes and political scientist Stephen D. Krasner.⁸⁴ The Carnegie Endowment is conducting a systematic review of opportunities offered.⁸⁵

Research is most useful to the policy community when focused on contemporary examples. Policy-makers will gain, therefore, from the empirical work of the Brookings Institution/Johns Hopkins University Center on Social and Economic Dynamics. With foundation support, the Center will work backward from both conflicts and non-conflicts to determine why different outcomes occurred in

⁷⁹ Many are in Washington, D.C., at the Carnegie Endowment, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, George Washington University's Elliot School, the University of Maryland, Georgetown, the Paul C. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and elsewhere. These scholars are joined by academics at Harvard's Kennedy School, Berkeley's Goldman School, the University of Toronto's Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, and other institutions throughout North America.

⁸⁰ See Leigh Ann Gilbert, *International Security Futures: Preparing the Next Generation* (a report prepared for the Henry P. Kendall Foundation, November 1998), posted at www.rbf.org/pws.

⁸¹ Examples include Stanford University's CISAC, Harvard's CSIA, or Berkeley's Energy and Natural Resources Group, mentioned earlier.

⁸² At least one U.S.-based think tank, the Carnegie Endowment, has a Moscow office. And the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and the Princeton-based Project on Ethnic Relations (PERs) both have well-developed multidisciplinary networks of intellectual leaders. Finally, Soros's International Science Foundations leave a legacy of independent scholars who can now create and sustain institutions of their own but may need the help of Western funders.

⁸³ Other examples include The World Resources Institute, which collaborates with the United Nations Development Programme, and is one of many organizations that use “scenarios”—a technique devised by the business community for corporate planning purposes—to help imagine different environmental futures, based on different assumptions. Furthermore, the Brookings Institution/Johns Hopkins University Center on Social and Economic Dynamics has used the adaptive agent model employed by Joshua Epstein and Rob Axtell. See *Growing Artificial Societies*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

⁸⁴ See Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983). For more on “hybrid regimes,” see Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift.” See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). Also see Abram Chayes, *International Legal Process* (New York: Warner Books, 1968).

⁸⁵ The Managing Global Issues project, under the direction of P. J. Simmons, has convened a group of scholars to consider ways to apply the lessons of regimes in one sector to another.

⁸⁶ See John D. Steinbruner's remarks at the April 1998 meeting of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on World Security's Core Group on www.rbf.org/pws. The Project commissioned a series of literature reviews on the state of debate on the relationships of a variety of social, economic, technological, cultural, and political factors to political stability and conflict, which are also available on the Project's website and in hard copy. The debate has been documented; the Center's empirical work will take that debate forward, grounding it in real life examples.

⁸⁷ Many policymakers consulted by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on World Security noted that it is not knowledge that they lack so much as it is politically workable options for acting. They feel pressured for quick answers by an impatient public flooded by information which is neither edited nor interpreted by mediating institutions.

⁸⁸ Scholars and activists have suggested many new mechanisms for policy-making and policy management that have not gained political support. New methods of calculating the Gross National Product that integrate the environmental impact of production and materials into cost calculations have been advanced, for example, as have non-regulatory solutions to environmental problems, circular production systems, and tools for economic analysis of long-term change, to make it possible to take chronic as well as acute problems into account. Several grantee organizations have advocated adoption of these unconventional methods and practices, but with limited success.

⁸⁹ The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Carnegie Endowment (CEIP), Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, Elliot School, the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and Georgetown all have corporate links. Others might be well positioned to play a convening role. And CSIS is already leading a discussion around the country of "global trends" and their effects. The effort, supported by Intel, and conducted in cooperation with the World Affairs Councils of America, is led by Michael Mazarr, editor of the *Washington Quarterly*.

⁹⁰ In Los Angeles, there is the combination of the Pacific Council on International Affairs (PCIP) and the World Affairs Council of Los Angeles, both of which are developing ties to the entertainment industry. In San Francisco and throughout the Bay Area, there is a World Affairs Council of Northern California, which hosts regular round-table discussions of established and emerging private sector leaders who discuss their global stake and responsibility. It has launched a series of discussion groups with South Asian entrepreneurs in collaboration with The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE). An important recent addition to the Bay Area is a Rockefeller Brothers Fund-supported program created by Ruth Shapiro under the auspices of the Conference Board and Asia Foundation. It convenes CEOs from corporations doing business in Asia to discuss their responsibility to the societies in which they operate. And in both Seattle and Portland there are World Affairs Councils, which are among the fastest growing in the Council system.

situations that might, at first glance, appear quite similar.⁸⁶ Research such as this is particularly helpful when it identifies new policy ideas and mechanisms for action that can gain political support. Current examples include the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as well as the practice of Joint Implementation mentioned above. Policy-makers can be overwhelmed as new test cases are thrust upon them—including civil conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and Kashmir; terrorist bombings in Northern Ireland and East Africa; and outbreaks of new or reemerging infectious diseases. Under these conditions and under unforgiving klieg lights, it is difficult to make use of external analysis that does not yield immediate, practical, and politically palatable solutions.⁸⁷

Interaction Among Policy-Makers and Independent Experts

Foundations therefore have used their convening authority and access to national policy-makers and international organizations to draw together multidisciplinary groups of scholars, activists, and practitioners to explore practical measures for governance. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the World Bank, for example, are joined by other grant-makers and CSO leaders in a discussion of the values that underpin transnational policy. By providing a neutral forum for quiet deliberation, foundations can occasionally help bridge the gap that exists between those responsible for policy management and those most likely to offer methodological innovations.⁸⁸

Some of the most rewarding grants have been to organizations or projects that foster sustained interaction between independent experts and government policy-makers. Support for efforts such as the Aspen Strategy Group and the Aspen Institute's Congressional Seminars remains a smart investment. More informal dialogues hosted by the Overseas Development Council, the Council for a Livable World and several other Washington-based groups are important in the fields of security, environment, and economic development. Foundations might apply this Washington, D.C., model to other decision-makers in other places. Given the growing role of non-state groups, including private sector actors, such an activity would be timely.

A small investment could yield large returns, were a program developed to promote and nurture sustained dialogue among nongovernmental experts and private sector actors playing a policy role. Such an effort could be launched in Washington, D.C., where a critical mass of scholars, policy-makers, and private sector representatives reside and work.⁸⁹ It could be fostered at Harvard's Kennedy School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. And it could be tried on the West Coast, where most business is global. The Pacific region owes its economic recovery to international industry and commerce—be it high technology, tourism, entertainment or trade, and the supporting services. Its workforce—both management and labor—is comprised of immigrants from other parts of the country and other parts of the world. Twenty percent of the work-force in Silicon Valley is foreign-born. A large proportion of the start-ups are Indian owned and out-source to South Asia. Well positioned to take on the convening role are several agile and inventive organizations with policy knowledge and strong ties to both established corporations and to start-ups.⁹⁰ Foundations might encourage informal partnerships among them.

Whereas in the early 1990s many foundations saw a need to develop a new paradigm or conceptual framework, most have concluded that such reconceptualization will continue to be the result of practical experimentation and policy choice, rather than

the other way around. Hence the need for foundation support for a practical agenda—and the institutional frameworks, habits of cooperation, policy innovations and political consensus that support its effective pursuit.

STRAND #2: STRENGTHENING GLOBAL ACTORS

Responsibility for practical policies will be shared by five increasingly global actors—the individual, the nation-state, CSOs, private sector corporations, and multilateral institutions. The challenge for grant-makers is to strengthen and inform each of these decision-makers, while encouraging their collaboration, as none can be successful on its own.

Like the post-Revolutionary War and post-World War II eras, this is a time for innovation on a large scale. In the 1700s, in a matter of decades, the American Founding Fathers invented many of the democratic institutions that underpin U.S. governance today. In the 1940s, the World War II allies introduced the institutions of international governance upon which states continue to rely and build. The Bretton Wood accords laid the groundwork for the economic integration that followed, including the creation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the concept of development assistance. The United Nations was born; it gave structure to a new concept of collective security and was later followed by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Marshall Plan rebuilt Europe and Japan and created a new relationship between conqueror and vanquished.⁹¹

Similarly, the present era calls for a combination of invention and cooperation to address the challenges ahead. New systems have emerged, and new governing structures have been formed to manage the process of technology-driven integration. The World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC), the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), and the European Union are fora for coordinating the economic activities of many states. A single European currency, the Euro, once scoffed at, is now a reality, bringing new fiscal discipline to European countries. NATO is expanding and assuming a new peace-making and peace-keeping mission. Arms control, environmental, and human rights objectives are being pursued through well over 1,000 multilateral agreements, and many more bilateral accords have been ratified in the past few decades. At the same time that new regimes are being created to manage issues across national lines, statehood itself is an ambition of many localities, and fragmentation is occurring around the globe. The state-breaking, state-making process is unfolding in the Balkans, South East Asia, and Central Africa, while conflicts continue to simmer in such diverse localities as Chechnya, Chiapas, and Kashmir.

In delicate times such as these, integration and innovation must be managed deftly, with due respect for the danger of upsetting a stable situation or preventing new and steady patterns from evolving. The findings of the CIA State Failure Task Force and the 1998 financial crises in Thailand and Indonesia suggest that even otherwise positive developments, such as democratization or increased economic openness, can be dangerously destabilizing if the requisite conditions are not in place. Efforts to improve governance must take local realities into account, so as to avoid destabilizing setbacks on the road to reform. “One size fits all” approaches to policy are unlikely to work, even as global norms emerge. Instead, basic principles need to be established

⁹¹ See remarks by Jessica T. Mathews at the August 1997 meeting of the Project on World Security Core Group at www.rbf.org/pws.

across borders and cultures: accountability, transparency, equity. They can then be applied in ways that fit the circumstances and the times.

The role for foundations is to help emerging leaders identify and advance those principles and to equip these decision-makers for success. Foundations have long been committed to strengthening the individual, the democratic state, and the civil society associations that mediate their interactions. Improving governance also has been a mainstay of the modern philanthropic enterprise. In this new era, the spread of democracy and technology creates the political opportunity and technical means to pursue these objectives more globally—and perhaps more boldly than before.

The objectives of grant-making would be to equip state and CSO actors for the Knowledge Era; to expand their community to include the private sector; and to support the development of hybrid regimes, or partnerships, among them.

Equipping State and Civil Society Actors for the Knowledge Era

Additional philanthropy might focus on four goals, which will help state and CSO actors at all levels to respond more nimbly to rapid change:

- The first is to enhance the transparency, accountability, and agility of both state and non-state actors, recognizing that these are the attributes of success in the Knowledge Era.
- The second is to improve each actor’s ability to operate in the global domain, either directly or through the effective use of the media, from the printing press to the Internet.
- The third is to train the next generation of leaders, reaching young people in their schools, colleges, and at home through age-appropriate media.
- The fourth is to help create or expand indigenous sources of funding, so that CSOs can be sustained over time.

Grant-makers are rightly focused on easing the transition in societies that are opening their economies and their politics. Continued support is needed for programs that build the democratic institutions and processes that underpin effective governance. The importance of these undertakings—and of the global transformation underway—suggests that bolder and longer-term funding patterns be considered. The National Democratic Institute, for example, now seeks to build a multi-million dollar endowment to give it the flexibility to seize the opportunities of the day and to take risks that traditional funding sources might avoid. The Monterey Center for Non-Proliferation Studies—a foundation favorite—nonetheless feels constrained by funding cycles. Its leadership is agile; its funding sources are less so.

CSO Actors

Foundations will continue to focus on “agents of change” such as scientists, women, and various epistemic, or knowledge communities. Many of these social entrepreneurs are also the engines of economic growth and operate easily in the global domain.⁹² Their advancement may be key to their society’s integration into the global economy. Foundation support will be needed to support education and training and to provide access to technology that will help them and their societies leap-frog into the Information Age and contribute to international community and commerce.

⁹² See Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift.”

Often they are represented by emerging CSOs that need technical assistance in order to attract the funds, membership, and the media attention they need to sustain themselves and advance their agendas. CSOs have emerged in states as varied as Indonesia, Russia, and the United States, where they advocate on behalf of goals as local as tenants' rights or as global as arms control or environmental protection. Foundations have provided essential support—often singling out individuals of great personal courage.

As the role of civic associations and other non-state actors grows, so too does their responsibility. Oftentimes these nongovernmental groups lack the transparency, accountability, and efficacy that is required of governmental players. Foundation support may be needed to help professionalize CSOs—particularly those in societies that lack a well-developed third sector—as they define public-spirited objectives and adopt democratic means. Furthermore, their effective use of the media is key to assuring an international reach.⁹³ As a general rule, foundations are more apt to fund programmatic initiatives, rather than provide for institutional capacity-building,⁹⁴ but such support is needed if CSOs are to meet their new-found responsibilities. Furthermore, indigenous philanthropy needs to be encouraged if these CSOs are to be sustained.

Expanding the telecommunications capabilities of think tanks and other CSOs should be a priority for grant-makers, especially those that seek to promote dialogue across borders. The Carnegie Corporation, for example, offers to publish the work not only of its own grantees, but of others. Attention to providing for the translation and overseas dissemination of professional and academic journals is also an important undertaking. Access to scientific journal, for example, would help build the capacity of scientific communities in countries where lack of funds, infrastructure, or political openness has an isolating effect. Similarly the “grey literature” of newsletters and other informal publications can now be put on-line and made available over the Internet to interested persons around the world. The simple cost of transcription can be a wise investment.

Recognizing the role that individuals and CSOs can play, foundations might consider pooling their resources to jointly bestow awards on individuals or groups on every continent responsible for making unique contributions to local and global society. Highly visible awards would not only highlight the importance of knowledge to an individual's success in this new era but would underscore the degree to which society as a whole benefits from the ingenuity of its members. The process of nominating and awarding the grants would further serve to expose many worthy people to new sources of funding and would create a forum for foundation officers to share their knowledge of outstanding “social entrepreneurs.” Finally, it would bring attention to and confer legitimacy on the work of the awardees, perhaps helping to inspire local grant-making in their support.⁹⁵

State Actors

The institutions of national governance provide the legal and regulatory framework within which the public good can be advanced. An important element of strengthening state capacity is the recruitment and training of the next generation of scholars and policy-makers. To meet the tasks that they will confront, these new leaders need to have been exposed to multidisciplinary analysis and to be comfortable

⁹³ The success of the campaign to ban land mines and Mexico's Zapatista movement was in large part attributable to the skillful use of fax and e-mail, as well as their appeal to the traditional media.

⁹⁴ Upgrading the information technology of CSOs is a worthy investment, one which the Irvine Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, and others, have been willing to make. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund has also put some grantees on the Fund's electronic network, and has offered the ongoing support of its own information technology staff.

⁹⁵ The MacArthur Foundation's fellowships offer a model, as do the awards made to environmental activists on every continent by the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Foundation. The Carnegie Corporation will soon begin to grant individual fellowships as well. The James Irvine Foundation has begun to grant “innovation” fellowships to those making special contributions to California. Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto argues that the “ingenuity” of individuals is the key to a society's success in the Information Age.

in both the world of theory and the world of practice. Many young people are exposed to the combination of scholarship and policy through fellowship programs at organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations or the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Fellowship programs that draw scholars from abroad, such as the Brookings Institution's new program for Koreans, are particularly attractive. Some foundations, like Kellogg and MacArthur, manage their own fellowship programs. MacArthur augments its program with grants to the SSRC for individuals engaged in interdisciplinary study. And MacArthur continues to make small grants in the former Soviet Union.

Improved general and formal education is also needed, to strengthen citizens' capacity to make informed decisions in a democracy—and contribute with informed consent—as well as to expand the talent pool of people willing to pursue policy careers. Improvements are needed at the elementary and high school levels, as well as in collegiate and graduate education. People form their views about the world around them and their role in it at an early age; education about international events and concerns should therefore begin in elementary and secondary schools, if not before.⁹⁶ However, most foundations that support both secondary school education and international relations tend to treat them as separate concerns. The trend toward identifying cross-cutting themes may change this practice. Opportunities might also be sought to support multimedia efforts to reach younger children in their homes through television, radio, and webcasting.⁹⁷ Foundations might consider partnerships among broadcast entities, school districts, and CSOs committed to the public education on international affairs.

Finally, governments benefit from the establishment of think tanks or networks of scholars able to provide independent advice and analysis. Many societies lack this asset. However, multinational networks such as those created by the Pugwash Conferences, the various National Academies of Science, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) or the Project on Ethnic Relations (PERs) provide a starting point. At least one U.S.-based think tank, the Carnegie Endowment, has created a Moscow arm.

Engaging the Private Sector

The goal is to reach out to a new set of decision-makers previously ignored by the funding community and shunned by some CSOs: corporate leaders and entrepreneurs in the private sector.

Global competition and the dramatic expansion of international trade underscore the importance of integrating the private sector into new international arrangements. International corporations have significant impact, and they make daily choices that influence national policies and regulatory capabilities, as well as international negotiations. It is critical to include these global actors, who can advance or undermine the goals of security, sustainability, and quality of life.

There are clear recent indications that international businesses recognize that their best interests can be served through the emergence of international norms and modes of regulation—adding both predictability and stability to the business environment.⁹⁸ They are concerned both with their ability to conduct business transactions globally, and also with their reputation among consumers as promoters or violators of

⁹⁶ One of the largest philanthropic organizations in the world, the William H. Gates Foundation, supports elementary and secondary education. It has also supported libraries abroad. It does not, however, accept unsolicited grant proposals. Further information can be found at www.gatesfoundations.org/whgfoundation/. The James Irvine Foundation has supported teacher training and the dissemination of an elementary and secondary school curriculum on international affairs, through the World Affairs Council of Northern California. The program is emulated by World Affairs Councils around the country.

⁹⁷ Public Television KQED and JPKids are collaborating in the creation of such a program, Corporation for Public Broadcasting funding permitting. Both public and commercial television stations have launched television shows for children and young teenagers focused on scientific and other educational issues. Foundation support for PBS multicasting, with the clear goal of improved international understanding, is needed.

⁹⁸ The U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association, for example, played an important role in convincing the U.S. Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Several industry groups participated in establishing the Convention's verification and inspection provisions.

humanitarian norms. These are incentives for private sector collaboration in managing change.

Foundations can explore ways to strengthen the private sector's role in global governance by supporting efforts to build consensus on where its policy interests and roles intersect with the requirements of global stability. Several CSOs are working with private sector actors to help them define their international policy role and stake.⁹⁹ And there have been effective grass-roots efforts to engage the private sector in policy concerns. For example, the environmental group Greenpeace International is credited with having engaged the insurance industry in raising concerns about global climate change.

Foundations can help the most inventive CSOs that successfully identify the intersection between the public good and private interests and engage the business sector in a shared agenda. They can also support business school efforts to instill a deeper sense of the public interest within the corporate sector and among emerging business leaders, by including ethics courses and exchange programs. Some management schools have established programs overseas designed to help build the institutions of new market economies.¹⁰⁰ Finally, organizations like Business Executives for National Security and others can be partners in developing consensus about guidelines for corporate behavior on issues relating to the public good.

In the cases of states, CSOs, and associations of private sector actors, the goal for foundations can be to strengthen each, so that they can contribute to global regimes.

Strengthening Global Regimes

The goal is to enhance the ability of new decision-makers to work as partners, constructing “hybrid regimes” of governmental and nongovernmental actors sharing responsibility and leadership.

Regimes, as the fora in which coordinated policies can be developed to manage transnational challenges, are increasingly central to global stability. They are unique in that their international authority rests on shared understandings, often reinforced by coercive sanctions. The enforcement mechanisms depend on the agreement of states to establish legislation supporting regime goals. Private individuals, CSOs, international organizations, and businesses help provide ideas to promote regime creation and to press governments and international institutions to comply with these arrangements. This makes such arrangements uniquely inclusive.

“Hybrid” regimes, incorporating non-state and state actors, have spread in recent years as CSO fora have begun to appear in parallel with formal international negotiations on such topics as global climate change, ozone depletion, human rights, and nonproliferation. Increasingly, states have begun to rely on CSOs to effect international policy change. For example, adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is monitored by citizens' groups known as Helsinki Watch, which sprang up around the Helsinki Accords. The transfer and trade of advanced weapons is followed by a network of citizens' groups known as Arms Watch, as well as a number of university-based and other CSOs.

⁹⁹ Among them are the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which hosts a program on the private sector's assumption of responsibilities usually associated with states. Heading up that program is University of Maryland scholar Virginia Haufler. The Council on Foreign Relations has a significant and loyal business constituency in New York—including many of the country's leaders in finance, law, the media, and industry—who participate actively in their programs and study groups, often assuming the leadership role. The Conference Board and the Asia Society have created a program to engage corporate leaders doing business in Asia in a conversation about the responsibility of their companies to the societies in which they operate. The World Affairs Council of Northern California hosts roundtable discussions among Silicon Valley executives and recently launched a program to engage foreign-born U.S. corporate leaders in a dialogue about their policy voice both in the U.S. and in the countries to which they have family and business ties. It has most recently co-sponsored a series of discussions with South Asian-born entrepreneurs.

¹⁰⁰ The Haas School of Business at the University of California/Berkeley, for example, holds an annual debating contest on ethics in business, which includes consideration of the private sector's role in promoting the public good. In 1999, its debate focused on the international responsibilities of corporations doing business abroad. These are the sorts of issues raised and discussed in ethics courses in business schools around the U.S.

In the process of negotiating environmental agreements, states and CSOs have reinvented the treaty-making process, creating regimes that are more flexible and thus more responsive to change. One innovation that has resulted is “fluid treaties,” the terms of which can be changed to take new conditions or new knowledge into account without renegotiating the accord. The Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depletion, for example, now requires a deeper cut in chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) production than originally negotiated because new scientific data supports stricter terms. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) built on this fluid model, creating the International Panel on Climate Change, an international body of over 2,000 scientists of world renown, who agreed in 1996 that human behavior has had a discernable effect on global climate.¹⁰¹

Allowing flexibility in a treaty’s terms, either by introducing a rolling compliance schedule or by systematically drawing upon the knowledge of nongovernmental experts, are innovations that can be applied in other spheres of international activity. Recently established regimes have also helped accelerate the timetable for decision-making in international fora. The Canadian government, for example, accelerated the pace of international decision-making on the Anti-Personnel Land Mines Treaty by establishing its own separate forum, along with several humanitarian and arms control organizations. An agreement was reached among states at the end of 1997, bypassing a more cumbersome UN negotiating process. And policy innovations, such as “joint implementation” and “cooperative threat reduction,” mentioned above, offer new models for cooperative governance. Both ideas resulted from collaboration among decision-makers within and outside of governments.

Foundations can help to support the development of new regimes and to bolster existing accords by enabling nongovernmental players to contribute to hybrid arrangements. They can help to support citizen movements that are pursuing parallel efforts. The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign was a successful example of such a citizen movement. A current international example is the Earth Charter Initiative,¹⁰² which is a compact among people to act in a manner that respects and protects the natural environment. Efforts such as these both promote citizen awareness and build the normative basis for future intergovernmental or hybrid regimes.

All levels of governance can benefit from capacity-building and reevaluation. The goal is to ensure a greater range of players both able and willing to cooperate to address new challenges and to expand the definition of relevant international players. Existing agreements deserve succor, and new regimes to address chronic or emerging problems should be created. Educational efforts to preserve and protect traditional regimes like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, START II, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are an urgent necessity. And hybrid institutions with an expanded circle of members may prove to be best able to cope with the fluid challenges generated by the rapid rate of change today.

Today, technological innovation must be matched by political and social innovation on a large scale. Individuals, states, CSOs, private sector corporations, and multilateral institutions will need to collaborate in novel ways to meet the requirements of the times. Recognizing that none of these actors can succeed on its own, foundations will need to help them all to develop the agility, transparency, accountability, and constancy that effective governance now requires.

¹⁰¹ See Jessica Mathews’s remarks at the August 1997 meeting of the Project on World Security Core Group at www.rbf.org/pws.

¹⁰² See www.earthcharter.org.

STRAND #3: EFFECTING NEW PARTNERSHIPS

The transnational dangers confronting the international community can prevent stable patterns from emerging in the kaleidoscope of globalization. It is important for foundations to select cases where their involvement can help increase understanding of interactions among trends, while also demonstrating the relevance and practicability of cooperative governance. Ideally, one would look for a case that cuts across all levels of security and engages all relevant actors. The challenge is to select one, the management of which offers a prototype for a new kind of transnational and trans-sectoral governance.

By combining the capacities of states and non-state actors in the management of a shared problem, new “hybrid” regimes can be created that have the flexibility to take new knowledge and new circumstances into account. International regimes stem from a combination of relationships, understandings, and shared expectations, and have shown utility in a variety of fields. It is, moreover, an area in which foundations and those they support have significant experience.¹⁰³

Several threats exist that can serve as cases for innovative management. Three of these issues are examined below.

The Nuclear Danger

New conditions call for a reappraisal of the nuclear danger and consideration of new collaborative strategies for its reduction. Degrading systems of command and control in Russia raise the risk of the unintended or accidental use of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. The number of declared nuclear states jumped in 1998 when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in quick succession. Despite the growing consensus that nuclear war cannot be won, nor limited, nor survived, the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, and France continue to rely on nuclear devices as weapons of war. New collaborative approaches to security offer an opportunity to abandon this stance. Advocates of ambitious worldwide regimes that ban the development, production, deployment, and initial use of nuclear weapons argue that nuclear war-fighting is a fallacy that can and should be exposed.¹⁰⁴ They recommend that the declared nuclear powers go beyond de-targeting nuclear weapons to taking them off alert, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, renouncing their first use, and reducing their numbers to as close to zero as can be achieved. There is prestige attached to nuclear weapons, but there is a stigma as well. They argue that this stigma is the norm upon which new global regimes can be based.

Regimes that would address nuclear nonproliferation need succor in the wake of 1998’s nuclear tests in South Asia. In addition to pushing the nuclear powers to substantially reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, those states which have dismantled active nuclear programs—South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina—could draw upon their moral leadership to help the international community join in rejecting nuclear weapons. Reinforcing new regimes can be non-state actors, such as Arms Watch and the Monterey Institute’s Center on Non-Proliferation Studies, which maintains an electronic database on the development, testing, and sale of nuclear and missile technology.

¹⁰³ The Rockefeller Brothers Fund’s security program, for example, was devoted to supporting organizations working for the extension of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) in the early 1990s. Other foundations supporting the NPT extension included Ford, Carnegie, MacArthur, the Prospect Hill Foundation, the Winston Fund, the Ploughshares Fund, the John Merck Fund, and others. A multi-foundation approach to issues that rely on normative change has also been effective in the climate change and nuclear freeze debates.

¹⁰⁴ See Morton H. Halperin, *Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987).

Regional security arrangements may also be required to address the demand side of the nuclear proliferation problem by reducing uncertainty. The supply side of the problem involves the systematic tracking of nuclear and ballistic missile transactions and the laws governing this commerce. The efforts of journalists, independent scholars, and activists can supplement those of governments, increasing transparency and raising awareness of violations of agreed-upon norms. Furthermore, independent programs to train a new generation of nonproliferation specialists, in both the established nuclear states, and especially in the newly declared nuclear states, deserve the continued support of foundations, as they are important investments in security.¹⁰⁵

Light Weapons Trade

Another case that has stimulated the interest of many groups from a range of backgrounds is the control of the light weapons trade. Small arms deserve attention because they present a threat that cuts across all levels of society—individual, local, national, and international—as well as affecting all regions around the globe. They play a key role in both interstate and civil conflicts as well as violent crime. Establishing a regime to address this problem would be difficult, because states hold no monopoly on the light weapons trade, and the opacity of the current global arms market facilitates re-transfer and theft. Yet control of light weapons requires a regime approach for these very reasons. Regimes can provide a forum in which to develop a consensus that the light weapons trade represents a profound and shared problem. Transparency, another principle of regimes, is also essential to confront the murkiness of the arms trade. This opacity is aggravated by the rapid spread of technology, but it can also be addressed by new information technology that can ease the tracking of weapons through tagging.

This is not to suggest that solutions are easily achieved. Light weapons present a problem of immense dimensions, and obstacles to the control or limitation of the arms trade range from normative disagreements about the merits of gun control to the simple fact that a wide variety of weapons are available on every continent. Monitoring and controlling the movement of these weapons would be extremely difficult. Such a regime would also have to overcome resistance at many levels: from weapons manufacturers and the governments that represent them, CSOs and individuals that perceive weapons ownership as a right or necessity, and governments that perpetuate their rule by intimidation, fear, or violence. Yet small arms present an acute and immediate threat to individuals around the globe and play a key role in violent crime, civil conflict, and interstate war. The enormity of the problem suggests that mitigating this danger should be a priority. But it is a task that must be undertaken with a long-term perspective, as no easy solutions are likely.

Both international organizations and individuals are seeking new approaches to the problem of light weapons diffusion. A combination of human rights activists, humanitarian relief organizations, and security specialists has taken on this issue around the world and has considered a variety of local, regional, and international policy initiatives. Scholars Michael Klare and Jeffrey Boutwell have documented their efforts, and, on more than one occasion, convened a representative group, which could form the core of a strong coalition. Each actor has contributed to the cause; their combined work deserves support.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ The Monterey Institute's Center for Non-Proliferation Studies trains those responsible for enforcing export controls in Soviet successor states.

¹⁰⁶ See Jeffery Boutwell and Michael Klare, *Light Weapons and Civil Violence: Policy Options for the International Community* (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1999), and on www.rbf.org/pws.

The United Nations monitors embargoes to determine their effectiveness and has worked to publicize the scale of the weapons trade problem, in order to generate more effort. Some individual governments and regional organizations are working to establish agreements on weapons limitations in their regions. Finally, recent efforts by the Canadian, Belgian, and Norwegian governments to convene discussions of the small arms trade make this an auspicious moment to promote international controls in this area.

Biological Weapons and Infectious Disease

The related dangers of biological weapons and infectious disease create a third area in which regimes have clear utility. Multinational networks to track the outbreak and spread of disease exist but need to be strengthened. And new technologies offer the hope of determining the likelihood of disease outbreaks in particular regions, making it easier to target specific regions for intensive prevention efforts by members of the medical community, relief agencies, the International Red Cross, and state and local governments. A surveillance and response network designed to monitor and react to the emergence of infectious diseases might also be applicable to the problem of biological weapons proliferation. This model of collaboration across sectoral and governmental lines has the potential to address the threat of the spread and use of biological weapons, a particularly accessible means of violence for terrorists. Foundations can promote the examination of this option and can educate the public on its need, desirability, and feasibility.

The regime around the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is in need of strengthening. The BWC currently has no enforcement mechanism, and compliance is voluntary. Like the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the BWC requires better means to track equipment. Safeguards on the transfer of agents internationally can be improved, especially by engaging the scientific community. Developing a protocol for inspections to strengthen the convention could also be augmented by supporting mock inspection efforts, to show the feasibility and efficacy of such visits. Efforts to develop a framework for the exchange of technological information for peaceful purposes might also be promoted. The International Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, comprised of most developing countries, is examining the question of peaceful scientific exchanges of sensitive biological information and agents. Foundations could also fund mock inspections and scientific engagement on biological transfers.¹⁰⁷

Pursuit of effective modes of transnational governance can help meet some of the world's most pressing challenges. But developing shared understandings and expectations requires agreement on the principles for which each actor is willing to stand, fight, or pay. Without such agreement, it is not possible to devise or sustain strong alliances and effective policy. In an era of ever-changing relationships, it is difficult to reach such a consensus. Education at all levels of human activity is a prerequisite to effective governance on the local, national, and transnational levels.

STRAND #4: BUILDING A CONSENSUS

The information revolution and resulting globalization offer the prospect of greatly broadening education's bounds. The combination encourages increased contact and offers better tools for communication. However, other aspects of the new era—the

¹⁰⁷ Christopher F. Chyba, *Biological Terrorism, Emerging Diseases, and National Security* (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998), and on www.rbf.org/pws.

speed of change and the new level of transparency needed to sustain international transactions—can serve to undermine deliberative process. Further complicating consensus-building efforts, a false sense of polarization can take hold. The new media used to express or transmit views tend to erase the grey areas, and politics and policy can be driven by the conflicting extremes that result. Added to this, in an era of globalization, multiple allegiances and identities exist, which are both fluid and changing.

Among the most problematic barriers to consensus building is the fear that attention to any one issue will result in the neglect of another. Trade-offs are magnified between the near- and long-term, between the domestic and foreign. The challenge, then, is to demonstrate relationships among issues, focusing on the local consequences of international events and the long-term effects of short-term action. The commitment of foundations to public education and engagement allows them to tackle this problem head-on; their interest in social equity impels them to consider the human condition as a whole; and their attention to responsibility is a reminder that, in an interdependent world, all states have both a stake and an obligation.

The key then is to engage a range of actors in a process of self-examination and to commit them to a process of collaboration. This strand of grant-making might comprise six strategies that seek to encourage collaboration, engage key constituencies, and build consensus around transnational issues.

1. Support for Epistemic Communities

The first strategy is to support the international activities of the many knowledge communities that have a network, an audience, and the capacity to communicate across political lines. National organizations such as the various academies of sciences around the world, and U.S. associations such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science or the American Physical Society have a history of interacting with counterparts abroad. Their members participate in international teams that review specific scientific problems without regard to political or policy views. And they regularly travel to international conferences and exploit new communications tools as part of their “peer review” process. This habit of professional interaction has led to the development of sub-groups and committees concerned with specific issues, such as human rights, environmental change, or arms control. Their intellectual contributions have provided ideas and legitimacy for novel state policies and have contributed to the building of an international consensus. Finally their interactions have created a culture in which the advancement of knowledge—a public good—is deemed as important as, if not more important than, the advancement of an individual or a single state’s agenda. Foundations have supported both scientific associations and individual scientists and engineers, in recognition that they often are at the forefront of reform. Furthermore, scientists and other independent analysts can provide policy-makers with alternative sources of information, upon which their decisions can be based. If freed from government patrons by independent funding sources, scientists and other analysts can offer an alternative to state-controlled information in societies around the world and provide a needed policy voice.

Scientists and engineers represent one of many epistemic communities with international reach and influence. The labor movement has played an historic role in

advancing individual and group rights around the world. It has reinforced the human rights movement, which helped build consensus for and continues to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords. Bar associations of lawyers have contributed to building democratic institutions and processes in countries in transition. And military officers have helped their overseas counterparts define their evolving role in new democracies. These contributions to building a more stable order deserve continued support.

Foundations have two opportunities. The first is to help membership organizations both expand their international reach and deepen their roots in their communities. While many U.S.-based groups have partners overseas, their ability to take advantage of those relationships is hampered by limited travel funds, inadequate communications technology, or even the lack of an introduction which a foundation leader might provide. Assistance with organizational development, as groups internationalize, can be a worthy investment. A second opportunity for grant-makers is to encourage those with existing international ties to use their relationships to foster discussion and consensus-building on specific issues of shared concern. An example is the nascent conversation among members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on the question of human rights.

2. Support for Advocacy Organizations and Educational Campaigns

Traditional scientific societies often overlap and spawn sub-groups with a specific policy interest, such as the Nobel Prize-winning International Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, mentioned above. Many epistemic, or knowledge, communities spawned advocacy groups¹⁰⁸ with a special expertise to offer or authority with which to speak. They too have benefited from support for extending their international reach. In many cases, the international network now exists but is in need of strengthening. Some affiliates are not as accountable or transparent as others. Other advocacy groups—whether formed around shared knowledge, interests, or values—comprise an international network, as is the case with another Nobel Laureate, Amnesty International. With Amnesty as a model, foundations have an opportunity to help others operate on a professional level and in the international realm. As new issues emerge, so too will new combinations of actors willing to coalesce around a clear goal. Foundation officers are in a position to expose new activists to the best practices of their forebears.

Collaboration across state lines is important, but so too are partnerships at home. Foundations have an opportunity to encourage and support national coalition efforts for public education on specific policy initiatives. Effective coalitions have been built around such issues as the nuclear danger or the spread of light weapons, as discussed above, as well as global climate change. Foundation support for educational efforts in these areas would build on the rich history of support for regimes to advance nonproliferation, arms control, conflict prevention, human rights, and environmental protection. The NGO-led campaign to ban land mines provided an example of the power of public education and advocacy, using the tools of the Information Age. It too was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

At key moments in the past, foundations have joined forces to finance important international public policy campaigns, funding separate communities like physicians, educators, and business leaders as well as supporting their sustained, systematic

¹⁰⁸ Examples include Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Federation of American Scientists, the Union of Concerned Scientists, Physicians for Human Rights, Lawyers Alliance for World Security, and the Nobel Prize-winning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

interaction. Organizations like Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and its national affiliates, Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists, Business Executives for National Security, the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, and Educators for Social Responsibility benefited from this approach and were able to help shape public attitudes toward nuclear weapons issues. Today, more fluid concepts and broadened agendas make it harder to focus attention on a single issue. And the reality of fundraising is that competition among organizations can yield more dollars than would cooperation. Foundations can encourage collaboration or the forging of effective campaigns by following two complementary strategies. The first is to support new mechanisms for collaboration—the costs of a shared staff person, mailings, meetings, e-mail, and other communications. The second is to offer support to the participants in the coalition using an equitable formula. The Nuclear Policy Committee described above is a good example of a small investment that yields high returns. It would fail, however, were funders unwilling to also support the individual organizations that comprise the committee.

3. Support Neutral Forums for Discussion

The third strategy is to support those organizations within the U.S. that provide a truly neutral forum and have the capacity to reach a cross-sectoral audience. Deliberation on issues of transnational concern is needed in all countries, as their roles change and grow. The U.S. faces a particular challenge, due to its assumption of leadership—but with the prior rationale for this leadership removed. The U.S., therefore, confronts the need to return to its first principles, an examination of the intersection between its interests and its values, in order to evaluate how and why it should be engaged around the globe. It is not the only state that is rethinking its role in world affairs, and some organizations, such as the Pacific Council on International Policy, the Asia Foundation, TransAfrica, the Atlantic Council, and the Japan Society are able to draw together intellectual and political leaders from abroad to consider their evolving relationships.

Organizations that provide a truly neutral forum should be encouraged and aided in launching deliberative processes across disciplines, sectors, and political points of view. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) which features an elite, engaged, and informed membership, is known for its studies program and its meetings at which government, corporate, and CSO leaders from around the world address the organization's membership. In recent years, the CFR has broadened its reach through aggressive and effective use of the media, including webcasting and videoconferencing, and collaborative programs with regionally-based organizations. Furthermore, it has sought a younger, more diverse membership.

Also well respected for the quality of its programming, the Aspen Institute holds a number of highly professional conferences on international issues for leaders from academe, business, and CSOs in the United States and abroad, frequently commissioning papers and publishing the proceedings. The American Assembly also convenes government and citizen leaders in different combinations around particular issues or policy concerns and produces a published volume, which is sent to a wider audience.

The World Affairs Council system offers a model for broad citizen engagement. Its affiliates are organizations with open memberships and deep ties to their communities. The system includes the Foreign Policy Association, which develops “Great Decisions” study group topics and materials; the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, which publishes analyses of public opinion polls on attitudes toward international engagement; and the World Affairs Council of Northern California, which provides teacher training and curricula at the elementary and secondary school levels. The council “system” of 83 organizations offers a unique opportunity to support a dialogue on the U.S. role in the world among both business and citizen leaders throughout the country. These conversations take place in meeting rooms, class rooms, and over websites, and many councils host their own weekly television and radio shows.

The United Nations Association is a network that is under new leadership and has a new source of funding with the creation of the United Nations Foundation. Other membership organizations, discussion groups, and website “chat rooms” are being created in cities and towns throughout the country, as Americans struggle with questions about their country’s, their employer’s, and their own role in the world. Resisting a winner-take-all approach to grant-making in this realm is important, as citizens seek out their own, most comfortable fora. At the same time, foundation funds are limited, and decisions will need to be made based on an organization’s potential to reach emerging decision-makers from a variety of walks of life, to provide focus to the debate, and to contribute to a consensus that is broad-based and enduring.

4. Support Education of Policy-Makers

A fourth means of engaging diverse actors is to support thoughtful interaction between government policy-makers and independent experts. To be effective, these efforts should be continued for a sustained period and should include international travel. Travel abroad, coupled with respectful, informal meetings with experts, can help legislators come to terms with America’s stake, interest, and potential role. Ensuring the neutrality and objectivity of such fora will improve their ability to create an atmosphere for deliberation and learning rather than for partisan politics.

In the 1980s and 1990s, foundations supported dialogue among legislators through vehicles such as Parliamentarians for Global Action and the Aspen Institute Congressional Program. The Aspen Congressional Seminars offer invaluable vehicles for sustained dialogue among legislators and provide for exposure to new scholarship. This depends, however, on the skills of former Senator Dick Clark, who is a highly effective moderator. Foundations have worked with the former Senator to identify a successor once he chooses to retire. The Aspen Institute also houses the Aspen Strategy Group, another model of discussion and decision-making among policy-makers. Its membership is comprised of current, former, and likely future government officials who interact with senior scholars in week-long sessions.

5. Strengthening Service Organizations and Supporting Track II Diplomacy

CARE, Doctors Without Borders, Mercy Corps, the Catholic Relief Services, the International Red Cross, Jewish Community Services, and other community or faith-based service and relief organizations receive their core support from individuals, governments, churches, or synagogues, especially in times of crisis. They engage in

direct action, negotiating cease-fire agreements or providing shelter, food, health care, and relocation services for refugees. They are sources of information and influence and should be supported in their efforts to educate policy-makers and engage like-minded organizations. These are not the only organizations that work directly with states or foreign nationals, sometimes undertaking tasks normally associated with governments. Some, like the Carter Center, Search for Common Ground, the Conflict Management Group, or the Project on Ethnic Relations, engage in conflict resolution exercises or negotiations, sometimes hammering out accords that are later agreed to by governments. Some, like the Nautilus Institute, have been able to travel to otherwise closed societies, like North Korea, to assist in the development of alternative energy projects. The Rocky Mountain Institute has advised China on its Energy Future. Foundations can use their convening function to help these organizations share their experiences with one another, with scholars, and with government officials, so that those with shared goals benefit from their knowledge.

Furthermore foundations have been effective in financing efforts to sustain dialogue across borders, on questions of rural development, resource preservation, or any of the other myriad problems that transcend borders and cultures. The Center for East-West Studies has been clever in identifying such opportunities to build confidence and habits of cooperation in East Central Europe. Several organizations have been working on water issues in the Middle East, some dating back two decades or more.

6. Foundation Initiatives

Foundations need not be shy about using their convening authority to leverage their grant-making. Foundations can create for a for discussion, new frameworks for action, and new sources of attention and funding. Carnegie Corporation's decision to publicize the scholarship not only of its own grantees but of other experts, is a generous and important contribution that can bring both publicity and legitimacy to new work. The multi-foundation Global Interdependence Initiative, first advanced by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the World Bank, is a new venture. The project is based on the belief that eliciting and strengthening the public's emerging "global values" may be a critical task if the U.S. stance toward the rest of the world is to become more genuinely cooperative and more consistently engaged. The initiative proposes to facilitate a broad-based dialogue in the United States on the challenges and opportunities presented by rapid globalization.

This initiative, which was launched at the end of 1998, will be sustained for ten years, provided that intermediate assessments warrant continuation. To be effective, the initiative will need to be collaborative, involving foundations, CSOs, corporations, and multilateral and bilateral agencies. The initiative's constituency-building activities will need to take advantage of existing organizations and enlarge upon their outreach efforts. It will benefit from the existence of cooperative efforts such as the Coalition for American Leadership Abroad (COLEAD), which seeks to build public support for the foreign policy budget and programs of the U.S. government. It can take advantage of those organizations that provide a neutral forum, a safe haven for debate that respects the sometimes private process of decision-making. Finally, it can help to reinforce efforts by political leaders such as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to build public support for global engagement.

• • •

As states and civil societies struggle to assure their survival, coherence, and advancement, the U. S. government and its citizens have an interest in providing help. But, the shifting rules of world order call for what Jessica T. Mathews terms “leadership without primacy”—something that is difficult but necessary for American political and citizen leaders to accept, absorb, and put into operation. If Americans fail to nurture their democracy by failing to fully participate in or contribute to its future, then it will become increasingly vulnerable to the dangers of a rapidly changing world.

Education and activism can motivate citizens to support notions of global engagement and to demand that their political representatives support policies that support this aim. Philanthropy can play an important role both as a model and in encouraging citizen participation. Ideally, this would start with education and outreach programs designed to expand awareness of international interdependence and common goals.

PART IV: CONCLUSION

Humankind knows it cannot afford the political, social, and environmental chaos that rapid change can trigger. As a consequence, people yearn for a stasis that can no longer be maintained. Grant-making should support the search for the means by which to anticipate and allow the fragmentation of familiar images, while working to avoid chaos and thereby welcoming the patterns that do emerge. It should seek to provide the knowledge and methods that will enable individuals, states, and societies to know when and how to move beyond the shattered image; to turn the kaleidoscope once more; to achieve a new and dynamic order that is equitable, sustainable, and secure.

This approach to grant-making offers a positive vision of an ever-expanding world community with a stake in and responsibility for managing peaceful change. Because the rapid interaction among people and problems is global in scale, there is a need to expand that community to every corner of the globe, paying particular attention to those actors whose engagement is essential to the success of global regimes.

This grant-making strategy acknowledges the reality of interdependence and embraces the view that global stability is best pursued by enmeshing a growing number of social actors into a larger political, economic, and security order. In this conception states and non-state actors build a web of relationships, giving them more in common than in conflict, reducing the benefits and raising the costs of violent conflict. This view holds that the net effect of such integration is the reduction of war between states and an increase in domestic prosperity and stability, increasing opportunities for all. It maintains that the combination of cooperative regulation and innovation will allow societies worldwide to break the cycle of pursuing their own security and prosperity at the expense of others, and of pursuing today's at the expense of the future.